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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The court of appeals has jurisdiction of this case, as transferred from the supreme
court, pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Whether the district court erred by enforcing a lease renewal option in the
absence of required mutual agreement on the rental rate for the option period.
Standard of Review: Correction of error in the interpretation of the option
contract. Brown's Shoe Fit Co. v. Olch. 955 P.2d 357, 362 (Utah App. 1998).
Record Citation: This issue was raised in defendant's motion for summary
judgment. (R. 99-103.)
2. Whether the district court erred in permitting extrinsic evidence without any
allegation or finding that the lease renewal option was ambiguous.
Standard of Review: Correction of error. Interwest Construction v. Palmer, 923
P.2dl350, 1358-59 (Utah 1996).
Record Citation: This issue was raised in defendant's motion to strike. (R. 21620.)
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS
This case is governed by interpretation of the written lease and renewal option
provision, which are set forth in the Addendum, hereafter "Add.," at 7, 29. The second
issue is also governed by the statute of frauds, U.C.A. § 25-5-3, which is also set forth
verbatim in the Addendum. (Add. 41.)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a declaratory judgment action to determine the parties' rights under a
renewal option provision of a commercial lease. (R. 1-3,42-45.) The option provision
requires that the rental rate for the option period be "mutually agreed upon" by the
parties. (R. 29, f 4.) The parties could not reach agreement. (R. 98,1f 9; 124,1f 4; 31,
161-65.) Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that, without agreement on
the rental rate, the option is unenforceable. (R. 99-103.) Plaintiff filed a cross-motion
for summary judgment, requesting that the district court set the rental rate at the
"minimum rent" set forth in the option provision. (R. 121-22.) While both parties
argued that the option provision is clear and unambiguous, and the district court made no
finding of ambiguity, plaintiff filed a supporting affidavit that provided extrinsic
evidence of plaintiff s interpretation of the provision. (R. 129, 166.) Defendant moved
to strike the offending paragraphs of this affidavit. (R. 213-20.) The district court
denied the motion to strike, denied defendant's motion for summary judgment, and
granted plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, ordering that the lease be renewed for
the option period at the "minimum rent" set forth in the option provision. (R. 250, 28790.) Defendant filed this appeal. (R. 292.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In December 1992, plaintiff, Little Caesar Enterprises, Inc. ("Little Caesar"),
entered into a Shopping Center Lease ("Lease"), as tenant, with Wallace Associates
Management as landlord. The purpose of the Lease was for Little Caesar to operate a
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pizza shop at the Bell Canyon Shopping Center in Sandy, Utah. Defendant, Bell Canyon
Shopping Center, L.C. ("Bell Canyon"), subsequently acquired title to the property and
succeeded to the rights and interests of the landlord under the Lease. (Complaint, ^flj 1-4,
R. 1-2; Lease, R. 7, Add. 7.)
The original term of the Lease was five years, commencing April 1, 1993 and
expiring April 1, 1998. The "basic monthly rent" was set at $1190, with "zero"
"percentage rent" based on gross sales during the initial term. The percentage rent
provision was marked "Deleted" for purposes of the initial teim, but remained part of the
Lease. The Lease was actually signed in February and March 1993. (Complaint, ^\ 5, R.
2; Lease pp. 1-2, Add. 7-8.)
At the time of signing the Lease, the parties also signed an "Addendum" to the
Lease, providing two five-year options to extend the Lease. The option provision,
contained in paragraph 4 of the Lease Addendum, requires the tenant to give written
notice of intent to exercise the option. Regarding the rental rate, the provision states that
"[t]he Minimum Rent for the first option period shall be at a market rate mutually agreed
upon by Tenant and Landlord." Such "Minimum Rent shall not be higher than $11.00 per
square foot." The market rate was to be based on "the then prevailing market rates for
similar space in similar shopping centers" in the area. The option provision concluded
that "Landlord and Tenant shall mutually agree on the market rate within 30 days of
Tenant's notification to Landlord that Tenant wishes to exercise an option period."
(Lease Addendum, ^ 4, Add. 29.)
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In a letter dated November 25, 1997, Little Caesar notified Bell Canyon of its
intent to exercise the first option for five-year extension of the Lease, commencing April
1, 1998. The letter acknowledges that "within thirty (30) days from Tenant providing this
notice to Landlord, Landlord and Tenant shall mutually agree on the market rate for
which the rental rate will be determined." However, the letter also states that "in no event
shall the minimum rent be higher than $11.00 per square foot." The letter concludes,
"please contact me immediately so that we can finalize this lease renewal in accordance
with the lease terms." (R. 31, Add. 31.)
In a letter dated December 8, 1997, Bell Canyon responded to the foregoing option
notice. While expressing satisfaction with Little Caesar's desire to extend the lease, Bell
Canyon disputed the apparent "perception that the option provisions [sic] of the lease
limits the Basic Monthly Rent to be no higher than $11.00 per square foot." The Bell
Canyon response distinguishes the term "Basic Monthly Rent," as defined in the Lease,
from the term "Minimum Rent," as used in the option provision of the Lease Addendum.
The response explains that $11.00 per square foot is "the minimum rent that the Landlord
will accept on the exercise of the subject option . . . and that negotiations between
Landlord and Tenant start at that floor for the subject 5 year period." The response letter
notes that market rates approximate $19.00 per square foot. The letter concludes, "Please
advise in what manner you desire to proceed with negotiations on the option period lease
rate." (R. 161, Add. 32.)
4

On March 16, 1998, Little Caesar sent a reply letter, asserting that "Minimum
Rent" and "Basic Monthly Rent" mean the same thing, and that the option provision sets
$11.00 per square foot not as the "minimum rent," but as the "maximum amount" to be
charged during the option period. Little Caesar then proposed an amendment to the
Lease, setting the option rental rate at $11.00 per square foot. However, Bell Canyon
never agreed to that rental rate and never signed the proposed amendment. (R. 162-65,
Add. 33-36.)
Little Caesar commenced this action one week later, seeking a declaratory
judgment that the option provision sets a rental rate of $11.00 per square foot. Little
Caesar also sought injunctive relief against eviction. (Complaint, R. 1-6.) Bell Canyon
answered and counterclaimed, seeking a declaration that the option provision contains no
method of fixing a rental rate without agreement of the parties, and that the provision is
therefore unenforceable and the Lease is expired. Bell Canyon also sought an injunction
ordering Little Caesar to vacate the premises. (Answer and Counterclaim, R. 37, 42-47.)
Bell Canyon filed a motion for summary judgment, demonstrating under
established Utah law that the option provision is void and unenforceable for lack of
agreement on the essential term of rental rate, or any mechanism by which the rate can be
determined. (R. 92-104.) Little Caesar filed a cross-motion for summary judgment,
asserting that the option provision sets the maximum rent at $11 per square foot, and that
the court should order enforcement of the option at that rate. (R. 118-33.) While both
parties asserted that the option provision was clear and unambiguous, Little Caesar
5

submitted the Affidavit of Mark Whittle, who offered his opinion that "Minimum Rent"
in the option provision meant the same as "Basic Monthly Rent" in the Lease, and that the
$11 rate was intended as the maximum rent, without any additional percentage rent
during the option period. (R. 166, Add. 37.) Bell Canyon moved to strike the affidavit as
inadmissible extrinsic evidence because there had been no allegation by the parties or
finding by the court that the option provision was ambiguous. (R. 213-20.) The district
court denied the motion to strike, denied Bell Canyon's motion for summary judgment,
and granted Little Caesar's motion for summary judgment, ordering enforcement of the
option at the rental rate of $11 per square foot. (R. 250, 287, Add. 1-3.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The lease renewal option is void and unenforceable because it lacks the essential
term of rental rate. The option provision expressly required that the rental rate would be
the market rate mutually agreed upon by the parties. The parties never agreed upon a
market rate. In ihe absence of required mutual agreement, the district court erred by
imposing on the parties a rate of $11 per square foot, which the option provision
designates as the "minimum rent," but which the court erroneously construed as the
"maximum rent." Because the parties never agreed on a market rate for the option period,
the lease expired of its own terms and cannot be renewed by judicial fiat.
The statute of frauds requires the essential terms of a lease to be in writing. The
parol evidence rule precludes a court from considering extrinsic evidence in the
interpretation of a contract, unless the contract is first found to be ambiguous without
6

regard to the extrinsic evidence. A court cannot properly consider extrinsic evidence in
deciding whether a contract is ambiguous. The district court erred by considering
extrinsic evidence from a Little Caesar affidavit without any finding, or even argument
from the parties, that the option provision was ambiguous.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

A.

THE LEASE RENEWAL OPTION IS VOID AND
UNENFORCEABLE BECAUSE THERE IS NO MUTUAL
AGREEMENT ON THE RENTAL RATE AND NO DEFINITE
MECHANISM FOR THE COURT TO IMPOSE A RATE.

Utah Case Law.
Utah law is well established that a lease renewal option lacking an agreed rental

rate, or a mechanism to determine the rate with certainty, is void and unenforceable. In
the leading case of Pingree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1317 (Utah
1976), the parties entered a five-year restaurant lease, with two five-year options for
renewal. Rental during the initial term was $500 per month, plus a percentage of gross
receipts. The renewal option provided for "the same terms and conditions" as the initial
term, "except that the rental amount will be renegotiated; however, maximum total
monthly rental shall not exceed $900.00 per month." Id. at 1320. The lessee exercised
the option to renew, but "[t]he parties were unable to agree on the rental rate for the
renewal period." Id. at 1321. The lessor demanded the $900-maximum, while the lessee
offered only $500. In a declaratory judgment action, the district court found that a
"reasonable rental rate" was $900 per month. Id. at 1320-21.

7

On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held that the renewal option was void and
unenforceable because there was no "meeting of the minds" on the rental rate for the
option period. The court cited and adopted the "majority rule," as follows:
The majority rule, in essence, is that a provision for the extension or
renewal of a lease must specify the time the lease is to extend and the rate
of rent to be paid with such a degree of certainty and definiteness that
nothing is left to future determination. If it falls short of this requirement, it
is not enforceable. [Id. at 1321, emp. added.]
The court expressly rejected the "minority rule" by which "the court implies a mutual
agreement for a reasonable rental." Id. The court concluded that even though the
"implied" rental of $900 was in fact reasonable, id. at 1322, "[t]he option to renew was
too vague and indefinite to be enforceable and the lease terminated by its own terms" at
the end of the initial term. Id. at 1321.
This Court expressly followed Pingree in the recent case of Brown's Shoe Fit Co.
v. Olch, 955 P.2d 357 (Utah App. 1998). In Brown's Shoe, the lessee entered into a
commercial lease for operation of a shoe store. The lease provided for an initial threeyear term and two three-year options for renewal. The rental for the initial period and the
option periods would be based on a square-foot rate, plus a percentage of "gross-volume"
sales. The option provision set a square-foot "minimum" rent for the option periods, but
provided that the parties "would agree on the gross volume figure from which to base
additional rent during each year" of the option period. The term "gross volume" was not
defined. Id. at 360.
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This Court held that the renewal option was too vague and indefinite to be
specifically enforced because, unlike the initial lease, the option left the percentage rental
for future agreement of the parties, with no definite mechanism for determining that
rental. A renewal option is a mere "agreement to agree" if it omits the material term of
rental rate. Id. at 362-63. Citing Pingree, this Court stated the law as follows:
In Utah, the law is settled that an option to renew a lease is
unenforceable unless the rent to be paid, or some mechanism for
determining the amount of rent, is specified in the lease. [Id. at 364.]
The Court concluded that "the option periods of the [lease] were fatally defective as to
price because . . . the option periods included no sufficiently certain * agreement as to
some formula or method for fixing [the rental price]/" Id. at 366 (citation omitted).
As this Court observed in Brown's Shoe, id. at 364, the Utah Supreme Court has
twice upheld Pingree in the subsequent cases oi Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 161 P.2d
499 (Utah 1988), and Richard Barton Enterprises, Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368 (Utah
1996). In Sine, the tenant attempted to enforce an alleged oral agreement to renew a lease
for bowling lanes "on reasonable terms." 767 P.2d at 500. The court refused, citing
Pingree and its "majority rule" that a lease renewal option "must specify . . . the rate of
rent to be paid with such a degree of certainty and defmiteness that nothing is left to
future determination." Id. at 502. The Sine court was unwilling "to find or make an
agreement where the parties had themselves failed." Id. The court reasoned:
Courts simply are not equipped to make monetary decisions impacted by
the fluctuating commercial world and are even less prepared to impose
paternalistic agreements on litigants. We therefore conclude that the
9

written lease terminated by its own terms at its expiration date, was not
renewed by the parties, and cannot be renewedfor them by the courts. [Id.,
emp. added.]
Similarly, in Tsern, supra, the parties to a commercial lease "'agreed in principle'
to the 'concept' of a rent abatement," but they never agreed "to the amount of an
abatement." 928 P.2d at 372. In a declaratory judgment action, the trial court reduced the
rent from $3,000 to $2,000 per month, based on the parties' agreement in "concept." Id.
The supreme court reversed, holding that a court may not supply the essential term of rent
amount when the parties themselves had not agreed to a specific amount. Id. at 373. The
court explained:
Courts may not impose a modification of a lease to which the parties
have not agreed and, a fortiori, may not do so when the parties have
explicitly disagreed as to the essential terms thereof. . . . Modification of
such terms as the amount of rent must be agreed upon in a modification of a
lease agreement. As Corbin notes, when parties have not agreed on a
reasonable price or a method for determining one, "the agreement is too
indefinite and uncertain for enforcement." [Id., emp. added.]
The court expressly relied on its holding in Pingree that an "option to renew in [a] lease
that provided for [the] rental amount to be negotiated but not to exceed [a] specified
amount [is] 'too vague and indefinite to be enforceable.'" Id. at 374, quoting Pingree, 558
P.2dat 1321.
B.

Application to the Present Case.
Here, the option provision in the Lease Addendum, paragraph 4, does not set a

rental rate for the option periods. Rather, it expressly requires the rental rate to be set by
agreement of the parties, based on then prevailing market rates. Specifically, the option
10

provision states that "[t]he Minimum Rent for the first option period shall be at a market
rate mutually agreed upon by Tenant and Landlord. . . . Rent in the second option period
shall also be at market rates" "Market rates" are specifically defined as "the then
prevailing market rates for similar space in similar shopping centers within 5 miles of the
Shopping Center." The option provision concludes by again specifically requiring the
parties to "mutually agree on the market rate within 30 days o f the tenant's notice to
exercise the option. (Add. 29.) Thus, like the option provisions in Pingree and Brown's
Shoe, the rental rate for the option periods was expressly left open for subsequent
negotiation and agreement of the parties. The obvious purpose of leaving the rental
amount for future option periods open is that market rates fluctuate with the economy and
inflation and cannot possibly be predicted with accuracy at the time the initial lease is
entered.
The parties never did agree on a rental rate for the option periods. The Little
Caesar notice of November 25, 1997 specifically acknowledges the need to "mutually
agree on the market rate for which the rental will be determined." The letter requests a
future contact "so that we can finalize this lease renewal." (Add. 31.) Obviously, Little
Caesar did not believe that the option rental rate had been decided; rather, Little Caesar
conceded that the rental needed to be based on a mutually agreed "market rate." Bell
Canyon's response of December 8, 1997 reaffirms that the option rental rate must be
negotiated by the parties, but suggests a market rate of $19 per square foot. The letter
invites further negotiations. (Add. 32.) Finally, Little Caesar's reply of March 16, 1998
11

proposes an option rental rate of $11 per square foot, attaching a proposed amendment to
the lease for Bell Canyon to sign. (Add. 33-36.) However, the proposed amendment was
never signed, and no agreement was ever reached.
Accordingly, as in Pingree and Brown's Shoe, there was no "meeting of the
minds" on the rental rate for the option period. Plainly, the rental rate was not set forth in
the option provision "with such a degree of certainty and definiteness that nothing [was]
left for future determination." Pingree, supra, at 1321. The option provision itself and
the correspondence of the parties makes nothing more clear than that the rental rate was
"left for future determination." As in Tsern, supra, not only had the parties not agreed,
they had "explicitly disagreed" on the rental rate for the option period. 928 P.2d at 373.
In the absence of required agreement between the parties on the rental rate, the district
court was not authorized "to impose [its own] paternalistic agreement^ on [the] litigants."
Sine, supra, 767 P.2d at 502. By so doing, the district court in this case actually followed
the "minority rule" that was expressly rejected in Pingree and Sine. In the absence of any
agreement on the "market rate" for rental during the option period, the option cannot be
enforced, and the lease expired by its own terms on April 1, 1998. See Pingree, supra, at
1321; Sine, supra, at 502; Brown's Shoe, supra, at 365.
The district court here imposed an option rental of $11 per square foot based on
the sentence in the option provision that says "the Minimum Rent shall not be higher than
$11.00 per square foot." (Add. 29; see Order. 1j 8, Add. 3.) The court reasoned that the
term "Minimum Rent," as used in the option provision, is the same as "Basic Monthly
12

Rent," as used in the Lease. (Order, ^12.) Because the Basic Monthly Rent during the
initial term of the lease did not include an added percentage rent, the court concluded that
no percentage rent could be added to the Minimum Rent during the option period.
(Order,fflf3-4.) Therefore, the court concluded that the $11 rate was not a "Minimum
Rent," as that term is commonly understood, but a "maximum rent," or "cap on monthly
rent." (Order, ^1 8.) Because Little Caesar theoretically offered the "maximum rent"
specified in the option provision, the court assumed that the parties "agreed" on that rate.
(Id.)
However, the court's analysis is both illogical and immaterial, in that it focuses on
the wrong term. The term "Minimum Rent" in the option provision, in both its common
and commercial contexts, means "the least quantity . . . possible in a given case and is
opposed to maximum." Black's Law Dictionary 995 (6th ed.) Minimum rent in
commercial leases is commonly understood to mean the base or guaranteed rent to which
a percentage rent may be added. See Annot., "Calculation of Rental Under Commercial
Percentage Lease," 58 A.L.R.3d 384, 398 n.53 (1974). Thus, the term "minimum" plainly
implies a beginning amount to which another amount, such as percentage rent, may be
added. The fact that Percentage Rent was not added to the Basic Monthly Rent during the
initial term does not preclude its addition to the Minimum Rent during the option periods.
See Brown's Shoe, supra, at 364 ("unlike for the initial period, the [lease] did not specify
the percentage rental that Brown's Shoe would have to pay . . . for the option periods").
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Accordingly, the court could not logically interpret the term "minimum" to mean
"maximum."
In any event, the semantic dispute over the meaning of "Minimum Rent" actually
misses and ignores the more relevant terms of the option provision explicitly requiring
mutual agreement on a "market rate " for rent during the option period. The meaning of
"Minimum Rent" cannot be determined with reference to "Basic Monthly Rent" because
the option provision expressly requires that Minimum Rent "shall be at a market rate
mutually agreed upon by" the parties. The provision then defines "market rate" as "the
then prevailing market rate[] for similar space" in the area. Plainly, the rate of $11 per
square foot, listed in the option provision as the "Minimum Rent," is not the "market
rate," and the parties never agreed to that rate. If the parties had intended $11 to be the
actual rental rate, they could have omitted all reference to later mutual agreement on a
market rate. There would have been no need for future agreement. As made clear in
Pingree and Brown's Shoe, the district court cannot simply adopt the "maximum" or
"minimum" rental contained in the option provision, even if that rate is found to be
reasonable. Pingree, supra, at 1320-21; Brown's Shoe, supra, at 360. Rather, if the
option requires agreement of the parties, the parties must agree, and the court cannot
impose its own rental in the absence of the required agreement. Sine, supra, at 520;
Tsem, supra, at 373-74, citing Pingree (lease renewal option that provides for rent to be
negotiated, but not to exceed a specified amount, is "too vague and indefinite to be
enforceable").
14

In short, the option rental rate was not specified "with such a degree of certainty
and definiteness that nothing [was] left for future determination." Pingree, supra, at
1321. The option provision expressly required future agreement on a market rate, and the
parties never agreed on a market rate. Therefore, the district court erred in imposing the
arbitrary rate of $11 per square foot, whether that rate is viewed as a minimum or a
maximum. Absent mutual agreement on the essential term of rental rate for the option
period, the lease expired on its own terms. Id.
POINT II:

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING EXTRINSIC
EVIDENCE WITHOUT ANY ALLEGATION OR PRIOR FINDING
THAT THE OPTION PROVISION WAS AMBIGUOUS.

The statute of frauds states that a lease of real property is void unless it is set forth
in a writing that includes all essential terms, including rental amount. U.C.A. § 25-5-3
(Add. 41); see Brown's Shoe, supra, 955 P.2d at 363. Where such a contract is
integrated, the parol evidence rule precludes evidence of its terms in addition to those
found in the contract. The intentions of the parties must be determined only from the
words of the contract. A court may consider extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent only
if the contract language is found to be ambiguous. See, e.g., Lee v. Barnes, 1999 UT App
126, ^| 9, 977 P.2d 550. Consideration of extrinsic evidence without a prior finding of
ambiguity defeats the long-standing salutary purpose of the statute of frauds, which is to
prevent parties from attempting to alter or augment their agreements through subsequent
attestations of side agreements, oral promises, or personal understandings that may not be
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true. See Abba v. Smyth, 59 P. 756, 758 (Utah 1899); 72 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of Frauds §§
2-3,44,274,289,296(1974).
Utah law is well established that, in interpreting a contract, a court must "first look
to the four corners of the agreement to determine the intent of the parties." U.P.C., Inc. v.
R.O.A. General, Inc., 1999 UT App 303, ^ 39, 990 P.2d 945. The parties' intentions must
be "determined from the plain meaning of the [contract] language." Dixon v. Pro Image
Inc., 1999 UT 89, If 13, 987 P.2d 48. Only if the language is ambiguous can the court
resort to extrinsic evidence of intent. Moreover, "whether an ambiguity exists is also a
question of law to be decided by the trial court before considering extrinsic evidence"
SLW/Utak L.C. v. Griffiths, 967 P.2d 534, 535 (Utah App. 1998) (emp. added). Thus,
"whether a contract is ambiguous presents a threshold question of law," which is
reviewed for correctness. Interwest Construction v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1358 (Utah
1996). A court must "first look to the four corners of the contract itself to determine
whether it is ambiguous." Id. at 1359. Accordingly, a court may not receive and consider
extrinsic evidence in deciding whether a contract is ambiguous. The issue of ambiguity
must be decided before and without resort to extrinsic evidence. Id.
Here, the Lease and the Lease Addendum constitute an integrated contract: "This
Lease and the exhibits, riders and addenda, if any, attached, constitute the entire
agreement between the parties." flf 22.15, Add. 21.) Moreover, Little Caesar consistently
argued that the option provision was clear and unambiguous. (R. 129, "clear and
unequivocal"; "no ambiguity or uncertainty"; R. 238, "lease clearly provides for an option
16

period with a monthly rent of no more than $11.00 per square foot.") Yet, Little Caesar
presented the Affidavit of Mark Whittle in support of its cross-motion for summary
judgment. (R. 166, Add. 37.) Whittle states that "it was understood and agreed during
the lease negotiations that percentage rent would not apply to Little Caesar for any lease
extension." (Ij 5.) He states that the undefined term "minimum rent" was intended to
mean the same thing as the defined term "basic monthly rent," without the addition of any
other component of rent, (fflf 8-9.) Finally, he provides his understanding that rent for the
first option period would not be higher than $11 per square foot. (T| 11.) Obviously, these
assertions are intended to alter the plain language of the option provision requiring future
mutual agreement on a market rate for the option period.
Bell Canyon promptly moved to strike the offending paragraphs of the Whittle
Affidavit, demonstrating that they constituted extrinsic evidence without any finding of
ambiguity. (R. 213-21.) Little Caesar argued, contrary to the foregoing case law, that the
court could consider extrinsic evidence in deciding whether the option provision is
ambiguous. (R. 228-29.) The district court apparently accepted that legally erroneous
argument, denying the motion to strike, again without any finding of ambiguity. (R. 250.)
The final Order prepared by counsel for Little Caesar hedges the argument by asserting
that the Whittle Affidavit is admissible "ft]o the extent that defendant's interpretation of
the [option provision] creates an ambiguity." flf 5, Add. 2, emp. added.) Accordingly,
even in the final Order there is no specific, unconditional finding that the option provision
is ambiguous. However, the Order goes on to rest its legal conclusion on the extrinsic
17

evidence of the challenged affidavit. (Order,ffil6-8.) Paragraph 6 of the Order refers to
the Whittle Affidavit as "unrefuted," but Bell Canyon provided no contrary affidavit
because both parties agreed and argued that the option provision was clear and
unambiguous, and the district court made no finding that it was ambiguous. Not until the
final Order was there any hint of a finding of ambiguity, and even then, only a tentative,
conditional hint.
In summary, the district court erred in permitting, and apparently considering,
extrinsic evidence in its interpretation of the option provision.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the district court's order and
direct that judgment be entered for Bell Canyon, declaring that the option provision is
unenforceable; that the lease expired on its own terms; that Bell Canyon is entitled to
recover the premises; that Bell Canyon is entitled to additional rent, according to the
terms of the Lease, from the date of expiration; and that Bell Canyon is entitled to its
attorney fees and costs incurred in this action, both in the district court and on appeal.
Respectfully submitted this. A ^ d a y of March, 2000.
KIRTON & McCONKIE

Bv: - ^ S 5 ^ £ ~ ^ >£T
-7tJ%^
Charles W. Dahlquist, II
Merrill F. Nelson
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LITTLE CAESAR ENTERPRISES, INC , a
Michigan corporation,
Plaintiff,

I
;

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

)
)

Civil No 980903087CN
Judge Homer F Wilkinson

vs.
BELL CANYON SHOPPING CENTER,
L C a Utah limited liability company,
Defendant

This matter camt before the court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment,
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, and Defendant's Motion to Strike the Affidavit
of Mark Whittle
defendant

Ronald G Russell appeared for plaintiff

Eric C Olson appeared for

Based on the record herein, the arguments of counsel, and for good cause

appearing, the court concludes and rules as follows.
1

The renewal option contained in the Addendum to the Shopping Center Lease

having plaintiff, as tenant, and Wallace Associates Management - Receiver, as landlord,

dated December 11, 1992 (the "Lease") is not too vague and indefinite to be enforced as
argued by defendant.
2.

The term "minimum rent" is used in the Addendum to refer to the monthly

rent defined in the body of the Lease as "basic monthly rent."
3.

The parties specifically deleted the Lease provisions relating to percentage

rent and there is nothing in the Addendum indicating that percentage rent would be
added back into the Lease during the renewal periods.
4.

Because the renewal option does not specify a change regarding the deletion

of percentage rent from the Lease, the renewal lease continues on the same terms and
conditions as the original Lease.
5.

To the extent that defendant's interpretation of the Addendum's use of the

words "minimum rent" creates an ambiguity, the Affidavit of Mark Whittle is admissible
regarding the parties' intent.
6.

Mr. Whittle's affidavit is unrefuted and establishes that "minimum rent" is a

commonly used term in commercial leasing that is understood to mean the base rent
paid by the tenant and that "minimum rent" as used in the Addendum was intended to
refer to base monthly rent.
7.

Mr. Whittle's affidavit also confirms that use of the term "minimum rent" was

not intended to make percentage rent apply during the renewal period, but that the
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deletion of the percentage rent provisions was intended to make percentage rent
inapplicable to the Lease.
8.

This case is distinguishable from Brown's Shoe Fit Co. v. Olch, 955 P.2d 357

(Utah App. 1998), and Pingree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc. 558 P.2d 1317 (Utah
1976). Unlike Brown's Shoe, there is no uncertainty regarding the calculation of
percentage rent that would apply during the option period since the percentage rent
provisions are specifically deleted from the Lease. In contrast to Pingree where the
landlord and tenant disputed the formula for calculating rent during the option period,
plaintiff here has accepted the $11 per square foot cap on monthly rent.
For the foregoing reasons and based on the matters set forth in plaintiff's
memoranda,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Defendant's motions for summary judgment and to strike the Affidavit of Mark

Whittle are denied.
2.

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

3.

The court hereby grants judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendant as

prayed in plaintiff's Complaint and declares that (i) plaintiff has properly exercised its
option to extend the Lease for the first renewal period of five (5) years; (ii) under
paragraph 4 of the Addendum to the Lease, the monthly rent for the first option period is
$11 per square foot, which is $1,636.25 per month; and (iii) 'he general terms and
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conditions of the Lease including the deletion of the percentage rent provisions continue
during the renewal option period.
4.
totaling $
5.

Plaintiff is awarded judgment against defendant in the amount of its costs
I+*.<**
Plaintiff is awarded judgment against defendant in the amount of its

reasonable attorney's fees totaling $ )1 j ^ **'*

^

as the prevailing party, pursuant to

paragraph 22.13 of the Lease.
6.

Defendant's Counterclaim is dismissed with prejudice.

DATED this ^

M day of

^C^^

_

-| 999.

BY TH&fCOURT:

APPR'

CharlerW. Dahlquist, II, Esq.
Eric C. Olson, Esq.
Bryan H. Booth, Esq. of
KIRTON & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

4.

I hereby certify that on the
C
day of August, 1999 a true and correct copy of
the foregoing ORDER AND JUDGMENT was hand-delivered to:
Eric C. Olson, Esq..
KIRTON & McCONKIE
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LITTLE CAESAR ENTERPRISES INC,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs

Case No: 980903087 CN

BELL CANYON SHOPPING CENTER L,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

Clerk:

HOMER WILKINSON
July 21, 1999

deborahw

PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s)
Defendant's Attorney(s)
Video

RONALD G RUSSELL
ERIC C. OLSON

HEARING
This case came before the Court for summary judgment. The Court
denies Defendant's motion to strike and denies Defendant's summary
judgment. The Court grants the Plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment. Mr. Russell to prepare order.

SHOPPING CENTER LEASE
rBELL CANYON SHOPPING CENTER1
THIS SHOPPING CENTER LEASE (this "Lease") is entered into as of the
_Jlth
day of
December
, 1992 , between
Wallace Associates Management
^Receiver
("Landlord"), whose address is
165 South Main Street, Salt Lake
City, UT 84111 . and Little Caesar Enterprises, Inc.
("Tenant"), whose
address is Fox Office Centre, 2211 Woodward Ave., Detroit MI 48201-3400 ATTN:
National Ops.
FOR THE SUM OF TEN DOLLARS (10.00) and other good and valuable
consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are acknowledged, Landlord
and Tenant agree as follows:
1.
Definitions.
meaning set forth:
19

Each of the following words and phrases shall have the

"Adjustment Date" (for purposes of Paragraph 4.2.1) means
and each subsequent
1st.

N/A

,

"Basic Monthly Rent" means the following amount(s) per calendar month
for the period(s) indicated, subject to Paragraph 4.2:
Period(s)

Basic Monthly Rent

Years 1-5

$1,190.00

"Commencement Date" means (i)

April 1

t

1992.

"Common Areas'' means the parking areas, roadways, pedestrian
sidewalks, mall areas (whether open or closed), delivery areas, trash storage and
removal areas, landscaped areas, security areas, pubic washrooms and all other
areas or improvements that may be provided by Landlord for the common use of the
tenants in the Shopping Center.
"Expiration Date" means the date which is
5 years
after the
Commencement Date, plus any partial calendar month occurring between the
Commencement Date and the first day of the first full calendar month following
the Commencement Date.
"Identified Items"
collectively, the following:

(for
N/A

purposes

of

Paragraph

4.3.2)

means,

"Occupants" means, collectively, any assignee, subtenant, employee,
agent, licensee or invitee of Tenant.
"Percentage Rent" means, during each full or partial calendar year
during the Term,
zero
percent ( 0 %) of the amount by which "Gross
Sales," as defined in Paragraph 4.3, exceeds the Basic Monthly Rent actually paid
by Tenant for such full or partial calendar year. Each such full or partial
calendar year shall be considered as an independent accounting period for the
purpose of computing the amount of Percentage Rent due.
"Permitted Use" means Tenant shall be entitled to use and occupy the
Premises for the retail sales of food and beverages and related promotional items
which shall include, but not be limited to, pizza, Italian specialties, bread
products, salads, sandwiches and any other items generally sold by Little Caesar
itores only (provided that Landlord makes no representation or warranty that such
use is permitted under applicable law), and no other purpose.
"Premises" means Store
space #1341 , consisting of
1,785 net
usable square feet, shown as the crosshatched area on the attached Exhibit A,
located in
Bell Canyon Shopping Center
(the "Shopping Center"), situated
at
1300 East 10600 South, Sandy, Utah
,
County of
Salt Lake
Stati of Utah. The Premises do not include, and
Landlord reserves, the exterior walls and roof of the Premises, and the land
beneath the floor of the Premises and the pipes, ducts, conduits, wires, fixtures
and equipment above the suspended ceiling and structural elements that serve the
6/NAB/CAESAR.LSE
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Premises or the Shopping Center. Landlord's reservation includes the right to
install, inspect, maintain, use, repair, alter and replace those areas and items
and to enter the Premises in order to do so, so long as same does not materially
interfere with Tenant's business.
"Security Deposit" means $

N/A

,

"Tenant" means each person executing this Lease as a Tenant under
this Lease.
If more than one person is set forth on the signature line as
Tenant, their liability under this Lease shall be joint and several. If more
than one Tenant exists, any notice required or permitted by the terms of this
Lease may be given by or to any one Tenant, and shall have the same force and
effect as if given by or to all persons comprising Tenant.
"Tenant's
which is the result
Premises by the net
Center, as reasonably

Percentage of Operating Expenses" means
2.9% percent,
obtained by dividing the net usable square feet of the
usable square feet of all premises within the Shopping
determined by Landlord.

"Tenant's Trade Name" means

Little Caesars Pizza

..

"Term" means the period commencing on 12:01 a.m. of the Commencement
Date and expiring on midnight of the Expiration Date
2.

Agreement of Lease; Improvement.

Deleted

3.
Term; Commencement Date. Tenant's obligation to pay rent under this
Lease shall commence on the Commencement date and shall be for the Term.
4.

Rent.

4.1
Basic Monthly Rent.
Tenant covenants . to pay to Landlord
without abatement, deduction, offset, prior notice or demand the Basic Monthly
Rent in lawful money of the United States in consecutive monthly installments at
such place as Landlord may designate, in advance on or before the first day of
each calendar month during the Term, commencing on the Commencement Date. If the
Commencement Date occurs on a day other than the first day of a calendar month,
on the Commencement date the Basic Monthly Rent shall be paid for the initial
fractional calendar month prorated on a per-diem basis and for the first full
calendar month occurring after the Commencement Date. If this Lease expires or
terminates on a day other than the last day of a calendar month, the Basic
Monthly Rent for such fractional month shall be prorated on a daily basis.
4.2

Consumer Price Index Escalation.
4.2.1 Escalation.
4.2.2 Index.

4.3

Deleted

Deleted

Deleted

Percentage Rent.

Deleted

4.3.1 Calculation and Payment of Percentage Rent.
4.3.2 Definition of Gross Sales.

Deleted

4.3.3 Deductions and Exclusion From Gross Sales.
4.3.4 Recordkeeping.

Deleted

Deleted

4.3.5 Landlord's Right to Audit.
5.,

Deleted

Deleted

Operating Expenses.

5.1 Definitions.
the meaning set forth:

Each of the following words and phrases shall have

5.1.1 "Estimated Operating Expenses" means the projected amount
of Operating Expenses for any given Operating Year as estimated by Landlord, in
Landlord's reasonable discretion.

5/NAB/CAESAR.LSE
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5.1.2 "Operating Expenses" means, collectively, all reasonable
costs, expenses and fees incurred or payable by Landlord in connection with this
Lease and the ownership, operation, management, maintenance and repair of the
Shopping Center, determined in accordance with the reasonable accounting
procedures and business practices customarily employed by Landlord, including,
without limitation, the costs, expenses and fees of the followirg real and
personal property taxes and assessments (and any tax levied in whole or in part
in lieu of or in addition to such taxes and assessments); rent and gross receipts
taxes, assessments levied by any owners association, master parcel owner or other
person under a common maintenance regime, removal of snow, ice, trash and other
refuse, landscaping, cleaning, janitorial, parking and security services, fire
protection, utilities, supplies and materials, insurance, licenses, permits and
inspection, advertising; 3ca3onal, holiday and other dccoratri9a^£Drno44ws and
activitios r mai keting; management—serv+ees, music—and nthpr pnt.prt.ainmeciL*.
administrative sorvicoC} including, without 1 imitat-ve^—4-ega4-y—consul t-rng-and accounting services-, labor and personnel, reasonable reserves—£or—-Operating
-E*pwse5, rental or a rcasonablo allowance for Hpprpriafma of personal property, ~Ju
-rmprfrvcmcntG—to and maintenance and repair of the—Shopping Center anrl-all \^>j|
•-equipment ucod in the Shopping Center; and that part of office ren-fc-eia-fche-refi-fcal f/V
-v-altjo of spaco in the Shopping Center- In no event shall Tenant's share of
Operating Expenses include costs of new construction, replacement or depreciation
of capital items, costs of H M C maintenance contracts, or any management or
administrative fees except for^Q 10% administrative fee All Operating Expenses
shall be computed on an annual basis
Tenant shall have sole responsibility for
and shall pay when due all taxes, assessments, charges and fees levied by any
governmental or quasi-governmental authority on Tenant's use of the Premise or
any leasehold improvements, personal property or fixtures kept or installed in
the Premises by Tenant
If any of Tenant's leasehold improvements, personal
property or fixtures are assessed and taxed with the Shopping Center, Tenant
shall, within thirty (30) days after delivery to Tenant of a written statement
setting forth the amount of taxes applicable to Tenant's leasehold improvements,
personal property or fixtures, pay such amount to Landlord
5 1 3 Operating Year' means each calendar year ending during
the Term and the calendar year ending on or immediately following the las day of
the Term
5 1 4 'Tenant's Estimated Share of Operating Expenses" means
the result obtained by multiplying Tenant's Percentage of Operating Expenses by
the Estimated Operating Expenses Tenant's Estimated Share of Operating Expenses
for any fractional Operating Year shall be calculated by determining Tenant's
Estimated Share of Operating Expenses for the relevant Operating Year and then
prorating such amount over such fractional Operating Year
5 1 5 'Tenant's Share of Operating Expenses' means the result
obtained by multiplying Tenant's Percentage of Operating Expenses by the
Operating Year
Tenant's Share of Operating Expenses for any fractional
Operating Year shall be calculated by determining Tenant's Share of Operating
Expenses for the relevant Operating Year and then prorating such amount over such
fractional Operating Year
5 2
Payment of Operating Expenses
In addition to the Basic
Monthly Rent and the Percentage Rent, Tenant covenants to pay to Landlord without
abatement, deduction, offset, prior notice (except as provided in this Paragraph
5) or demand Tenant's Share of Operating Expenses in lawful money of the United
States at such place as Landlord may designate, in accordance with the provisions
of this Paragraph 5, in advance on or before the first day of each calendar month
during the Term, commencing on the Commencement Date and prior to each Operating
Year after the Commencement Date, if reasonably practicable, Landlord shall
furnish Tenant with a written statement (the "Estimated Operating Expenses
Statement") showing in reasonable detail the computation of Tenant's Estimated
Share of Operating Expenses
On or prior to the Commencement Date, and on the
first day of each month following the Commencement Date, Tenant shall pay to
Landlord one-twelfth (l/12th) of Tenant's Estimated Share of Operating Expenses
as specified in the Estimated Operating Expenses as specified in the Estimated
Operating Expenses Statement for such Operating Year
If Landlord fails to give
lenant an Estimated Operating Expenses Statement prior to any Operating Year,
Tenant shall continue to pay on the basis of the Estimated Operating Expenses
Statement for the prior Operating Year until the Estimated Operating Expenses
Statement for the current Operating Year is received
If at any time it appears
6/NAB/CAESAR LSE
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to Landlord that the Operating Expenses will vary from Landlord's original
estimate, Landlord may deliver to Tenant a revised Estimated Operating Expenses
Statement for such Operating Year, and subsequent payments by Tenant for such
Operating Year shall be based on such revised statement. Within a reasonable
time after the expiration of any Operating Year, and subsequent payments by
Tenant for such Operating Year shall be based on such revised statement. Within
a reasonable time after the expiration of any Operating Year, Landlord shall
furnish Tenant with a written statement (the "Actual Operating Expenses
Statement") showing in reasonable detail the computation of Tenant's Share of
Operating Expenses for such Operating Year and the amount by which such amount
exceeds or is less than the amounts paid by Tenant during such Operating Year.
If the Actual Operating Expenses Statement indicates that the amount actually
paid by Tenant for the relevant Operating Year is less than Tenant's Share of
Operating Expenses for such Operating Year, Tenant shall pay to Landlord such
deficit within thirty (30) days after delivery of the Actual Operating Expenses
Statement. Such payments by Tenant shall be made notwithstanding that the Actual
Operating Expenses Statement is furnished to Tenant after the expiration of the
Term or sooner termination of this Lease. If the Actual Operating Expenses
Statement indicates that the amount actually paid by Tenant for the relevant
Operating Year exceeds Tenant's of Operating Expenses for such Operating Year,
such excess shall be applied against any amount then payable or to become payable
by Tenant under this Lease. No failure by Landlord to require the payment of
Tenant's Share of Operating Expenses for any period shall constitute a waiver of
Landlord's right to collect such amount for such period or for any subsequent
period. Nothing contained in this Paragraph 5 shall be construed so as to reduce
the Basic Monthly Rent. Landlord shall supply Tenant with copies of actual bills
and paid receipts upon Tenant's request for same.
5.3
Resolution of Disagreement. Every statement given to Tenant
by Landlord under this Lease, including, without limitation, any statement given
to Tenant pursuant to Paragraph 5.2, shall be conclusive and binding on Tenant
unless within thirty (30) days after the receipt of such statement Tenant
notifies Landlord that Tenant disputes the correctness of such statement,
specifying the particular respects in which the statement is claimed to be
incorrect.
Pending the determination of such dispute by agreement between
Landlord and Tenant, Tenant shall, within thirty (30) days after receipt of such
statement, pay the amounts set forth in such statement in accordance with such
statement, and such payment shall be without prejudice to Tenant's position. If
such dispute exists and it is subsequently determined that Tenant has paid
amounts in excess of those then due and payable under this Lease, Landlord, at
Landlord's option, shall either apply such excess to an amount to become payable
under this Lease or return such excess to Tenant. Landlord shall grant to an
independent certified public accountant retained by Tenant reasonable access to
Landlord's books and records for the purpose of Verifying Operating Expenses
incurred by Landlord, at Tenant's expense.
6.

Security Deposit.

7.

Use and Operation.

Deleted

7.1
Use. Tenant shall not use or occupy or permit the Premises to
be used or occupied for any purpose other than for the Permitted Use, and shall
not do or permit anything to be done by Tenant's Occupants which may (a) increase
the existing rate or violate the provisions of any insurance carried with respect
to the Shopping Center; (b) create a public or private nuisance, commit waste or
interfere with, annoy or disturb any other tenant or occupant of the Shopping
Center or Landlord in the operation of the Shopping Center; (c) overload the
floors or otherwise damage the structure of the Shopping Center; (d) constitute
an improper, immoral or objectionable purpose; (e) violate any present or future
governmental or quasi-governmental laws, ordinances, regulations or requirements
or any covenants, conditions, and restrictions existing with respect to the
Shopping Center; (f) subject Landlord or any other tenant to any liability to any
third party; or (g) lower the first-class character of the Shopping Center.
Tenant shall, at Tenant's sole cost, (u) operating Tenant's business on the
Premises under Tenant's Trade Name only; (v) use the Premises in a careful, safe
and proper manner; (w) comply with all present and future governmental or quasigovernmental laws, ordinances, regulations and requirements and any covenants,
conditions and restrictions existing with respect to the Sopping Center,
including, without limitation, those relating to hazardous substances, hazardous
wastes, pollutants or contaminants; (x) comply with the requirements of any board
6/NAB/CAESAR.LSE
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or fire underwriters or other similar body relating to the Premises: (y) keep the
Premises free of objectionable noises and odors; and (z) not store, use or
dispose of any hazardous substances, hazardous wastes, pollutants or contaminants
on the Premise. Except as set forth in this Lease, no representation or warranty
has been made to, or relied on by, Tenant concerning the Premises, including,
without limitation, the fitness or suitability or the Premise for the conduct of
Tenant's business, nor has Landlord agreed to undertake any modification,
alteration or improvement of the Premises.
Tenant shall not do or pormit the
doing of anything in connection wi^h Tenant's business or advertising, which in
the reasonable judgement of Landlrrd may reflect unfavorably on Landlord or the
Shopping Center, or confuse or mislead the public as to any relationship between
Landlord and Tenant.
7.2
Covenant of Continuous Operation.
Tenant shall open the
Premises for business on or before the Commencement Date. Tenant's hours of
business shall be the same of those of the other Little Caesar carry-out stores
in the greater Salt Lake City area. Tenant shall not (a) use or permit the use
of any portion of the Premises for the conduct in or on the Premises of what is
commonly known in the retial trade as an outlet store or second-hand store, or
an army, navy, or governmental surplus store; (b) advertise or conduct any
distress, fire, bankruptcy, liquidation, relocation, closing or going our of
business sale unless such advertisement is true and Landlord gives prior written
consent, which may be withheld by Landlord in Landlord's sole discretion for any
reason or for no reason; (c) warehouse and stock within the Premises any goods,
wares or merchandise other than that which Tenant intends to offer for sale from
the Premise; or (d) use or permit the use on the Premises of any pinball
machines, video games or other devices or equipment for amusement or recreation,
or any vending machines, newspaper racks, pay telephone or other coin-operated
devices. Tenant may have one amusement game in the lobby.
7.3

Radius Restriction.

Deleted.

8.
Util ities and Services. Commencing on the date of this Lease, Tenant
shall pay all initial utility deposits and fees and monthly service charges for
water, electricity, sewage, gas, telephone and other utility services furnished
to the Premises. If any such service is not separately metered or billed to
Tenant, but rather is billed to and paid by Landlord, Tenant shall pay to
Landlord Tenant's pro rata share of the cost of such service, as reasonably
determined by Landlord. Landlord shall not be liable for any loss or damage
resulting from an interruption of any such service unless such interruption is
caused by the negligence of the Landlord, its agents, or employees.
9.
Maintenance and Repairs; Alteration; Access to Premises; Reserved
Rights in Common Area.
9.1
Maintenance and Repairs.
Tenant, at Tenant's sole cost and
expense, shall maintain the Premises and every party of the Premises (including,
without limitation, all floors, walls and ceilings and their coverings, doors and
locks, window casements and frames, glass and plate glass, furnishings, trade
fixtures, signage, leasehold improvements, equipment and other personal property
from time to time situated in or on the Premises) in good order, condition and
repair and in a clean and sanitary condition. The Basic Monthly Rent and all
other amounts payable by Tenant to Landlord are absolutely net to Landlord, and
Tenant shall, except as provided in this Lease, pay (either directly or by
payment of Tenant's Share of Operating Expenses pursuant to Paragraph 5) for all
insurance, taxes, utilities, repairs, maintenance and all other services and
costs relating to the Premises and to Tenant's use of the Premises. Landlord
shall, at its sole cost and expense maintain the roof and structured members of
the space, the foundations, outer walls, and structured soundness of the building
unless Tenant, through Tenant's negligence causes damage to any of there items.
Then Tenant becomes responsible for their repair or replacement.
9.2
Alterations.
Tenant shall not make any change, addition
or improvement to the Premises (including, without limitation, the attachment of
any fixture or equipment), unless such change is non-structural, less than a cost
of $3,000 and: (a) equals or exceeds the then-current standard for the Shopping
Center ana utilizes only new and first-grade materials; (b) is in conformity with
all applicable governmental and quasi-governmental laws, ordinances, regulations
and requirements, and is made after obtaining any required permits and licenses;
(c) is made pursuant to plans and specifications approved in writing in advance
6/NAB/CAESAR.LSE
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by Landlord; (e) is carried out by persons approved in writing by Landlord, who,
if required by Landlord, deliver to Landlord before commencement of their work
proof of such Insurance coverage as Landlord may require, with Landlord named as
an additional insured.
Any such change, addition or improvement shall
immediately become the property of Landlord. Tenant shall promptly pay the
entire cost of any such change, addition or improvement. Tenant shall indemnify,
defend and hold harmless Landlord from and against all liens, claims, damages,
losses, liabilities and expenses, including attorneys' fees, which may arise out
of, or be connected in any way with such change, addition or improvement. Within
thirty (30) days following the imposition of any lien resulting from any such
change, addition improvement, Tenant shall cause such lien to be released of
record by payment of money or posting of a proper bond.
9.3
Access to Premises.
Landlord
and
Landlord's
agents,
employees and contractors may enter the Premises at reasonable times and upon 24
hours notice to Tenant for the purpose of cleaning, inspecting, altering and
repairing the Premises and ascertaining compliance with the provisions of this
Lease by Tenant.
Landlord shall have free access to the Premises in an
emergency.
Landlord may also show the Premises to prospective purchasers,
tenants or mortgagees at reasonable times and after 24 hours notice. Tenant
waives any claim for any damages, injury or inconvenience to, or interference
with, Tenant's business, loss of occupancy or quiet enjoyment of the Premises and
other loss occasioned by such entry, unless caused by Landlord's willful
misconduct or gross negligence. Tenant alone will have a key to unlock all doors
in the Premises and if Landlord or Landlord's agents need to gain entry, as in
emergencies, Landlord may gain entrance to the Premises by force.
9.4
Reserved Rights in Common Area. Landlord reserves the right,
at any time or from time to time, to:
(a) establish reasonable rules and
regulations for the use of the Common Areas (including, without limitation, the
delivery of goods and the disposal of trash); (b) use or permit the use of the
Common Areas by persons to whom Landlord may grant or may have granted such
rights in such manner as Landlord may from time to time designate, including,
without limitation, truck and trailer sales and special promotional events; (c)
close all or any portion of the Common Areas to make repairs or changes to, to
prevent a dedication of, to prevent the accrual of any rights of any person or
the public in, or to discourage noncustomer use of or parking on, the Common
Areas; (d) construct additional buildings in, or expand existing buildings into,
the Common Areas and to change the layout of the Common Areas, including, without
limitation, enlarging or reducing the shape and size of the Common Areas, whether
by the Addition of buildings, other improvements or any other manner; (e) enter
into operating agreements relating to the Common Areas with persons selected by
Landlord; and (f) do such other acts in and to the Common Areas as in Landlord's
judgment may be desirable. If the Common Areas are diminished, Landlord shall
not be subject to any liability, Tenant shall not be entitled to any compensation
or diminution or rent and such diminishment shall not be deemed to be an actual
or constructive eviction. Any changes the Landlord makes to the Common Area of
the Shopping Center should not unreasonably interfere with Tenant's ability to
conduct its business. Landlord shall not build or permit any structures or
obstructions of any kind to remain in or on the common areas for an extended
period of time which would materially interfere with Tenant's business or use and
enjoyment of the Premises, or obstruct the visibility or access to the Premises.
However r landlord may build additional structures, pads, etc. to expand the
center which would not be considered as interfering with Tenant's business.
10.

Assignment.

10.1 Prohibition.
Tenant shall not, either voluntarily or by
operation of law, assign, transfer, mortgage, encumber, pledge or hypothecate
this Lease or Tenant's interest in this Lease, in whole or in part, permit the
use of the Premises or any part of the Premises by any persons other than Tenant
or Tenant's employees, or sublease the Premises or any part of the Premises,
without the prior written consent of Landlord, which may not be unreasonably
withheld by Landlord. Any transfer of this Lease from Tenant by merger,
consolidation, liquidation or transfer of assets shall constitute as assignment
for the purposes of this Lease. If Tenant is a corporation, an unincorporated
association or a partnership, the assignment, transfer, mortgage, encumbrance,
pledge or hypothecation of any stock or interest in such corporation, association
or partnership in the aggregate in excess of forty-nine percent (49%) shall be
deemed an assignment within the meaning of this Paragraph. Consent to any
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assignment or subleasing shall not operate as a waiver of the necessity for
consent to any subsequent assignment or subleasing and the terms of such consent
shall be binding on any person holding by, under or through Tenant.
At
Landlord's option, any assignment or sublease without Landlord's prior written
consent shall be void. Tenant shall have the right to assign this Lease without
Landlord's consent and without payment of any assignment fees to a corporation
the outstanding stock of which is fifty (50%) percent or more owned by Michael
or Marian H i t c h , or to Tenant's wholly owned subsidiary, or to Tenant's parent
corporation, or, if Tenant merges or consolidates, then to the surviving entity
or to any approved franchisee of the Tenant as long as Tenant remains as a
guarantee to the lease.
10.2 Termination.
If Tenant requests Landlord's consent to an
assignment of this Lease or to a subleasing of the whole or any part of the
Premises, Tenant shall submit to Landlord the terms or such assignment or
subleasing, the name and address of the proposed assignee or subtenant, such
information relating to the nature of such assignee's or subtenant's business and
finances as Landlord may reasonably require and the proposed effective date (the
"Effective Date") of the proposed assignment or subleasing (which Effective Date
shall be neither less than thirty (30) nor more than ninety (90) days following
the date.of Tenant's submission of such information).
10.3 Landlord's Rights.
If this Lease is assigned or if all or
any portion of the Premises is subleased or occupied by any person other than
lenant without obtaining Landlord's consent, Landlord may collet rent and other
charges from such assignee or other party, and apply the amount collected to the
rent and other charges reserved under this Lease, but such collection shall not
constitute consent or waiver of the necessity of consent to such assignment or
subleasing, nor shall such collection constitute the recognition of such assignee
or subtenant as Tenant under this Lease or a release of Tenant from the further
performance of all of the covenants and obligations of Tenant contained in this
Lease. No consent by Landlord to any assignment or subleasing by Tenant shall
relieve Tenant of any obligation to be paid or performed by Tenant under this
Lease, whether occurring before or after such consent, assignment or subleasing,
but rather Tenant and Tenant's assignee or subtenant, as the case may be, shall
be jointly and severally primarily liable for such payment and performance. No
assignment or subleasing under this Lease shall be effective unless and until
Tenant provides the Landlord an executed counterpart of the assignment or
sublease agreement, which shall specifically state that (a) such agreement is
subject to all of the provisions of this Lease; (b) in the case of an assignment,
the assignee assumes and agrees to perform all of Tenant's obligations under the
Lease; (c) the assignee or subtenant, as the case may be, amy not further assign
such agreement, or allow the Premises to be used by others! without the prior
written consent of Landlord in each instance; (d) a consent by Landlord to such
assignment or subleasing shall not be deemed or construed to modify, amend or
affect the provisions of this Lease or Tenant's obligations under this Lease,
which shall continue to apply to the Premises and the occupants of the Premises
as if the assignment or sublease had not been made; (e) if Tenant defaults in the
payment of any amounts due under this Lease, Landlord is authorized to collect
any rents or other amounts due from any assignee, subtenant or other occupant of
the Premises and to apply the net amounts collected to the sums reserved in this
Lease; and (f) the receipt by Landlord of any amounts from an assignee, subtenant
or other occupant of any part of the Premises shall not be deemed or construed
as releasing Tenant from Tenant's obligations under this Lease of the acceptance
of that party as a direct tenant. If all or any portion of the Premises is
assigned or subleased and the compensation to be received by Tenant exceeds the
Basic Monthly Rent (or pro rata portion of the Basic Monthly Rent, as the case
may be) applicable to the portion being assigned or sublease, Tenant shall pay
half of such excess to Landlord on the first day of each calendar month.
11.

Indemnity; Waiver and Release.

11.1 Indemnity. Tenant shall indemnify, defend and hold harmless
Landlord and Landlord's employees and agents from and against all demands,
claims, causes of action, judgements, losses, damages (including consequential
damages), liabilities, fines, penalties, costs and expenses, including attorneys'
fees, arising from the occupancy or use of the Shopping Center by Tenant or
Tenant's Occupants, any hazardous substances, hazardous wastes, pollutants or
contaminants deposited, released or stored by Tenant or Tenant's Occupants on the
Property, the conduct of Tenant's business in the Shopping Center, any act or
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omission done, permitted or suffered by Tenant or any of Tenant's Occupants, any
default pr nonperformance by Tenant under this Lease, any injury or damage to the
person, property or business of Tenant or Tenant's Occupants or any litigation
commenced by or against Tenant to which Landlord is made a party without fault
on the part of Landlord.
If any action or proceeding is brought against
Landlord, Landlord's employees or Landlord's agents by reason of any such claim,
Tenant, on notice from counsel reasonably satisfactory to Landlord. Landlord
shall indemnify Tenant from damages which arise out of the willful negligence,
acts or omissions of Landlord, its' agents, employees, or contractors. The
provisions of this Paragraph 11.1 shall survive the expiration of the Term or
sooner termination of this Lease.
11.2 Waiver and Release.
Tenant waives and releases all claims
against Landlord and Landlord's employees and agents with respect to all matters
for which Landlord has disclaimed liability pursuant to the provisions of this
Lease. In addition, Landlord and Landlord's employees and agents shall not be
liable for any loss, injury, death or damage (including any consequential damage)
to persons, property or Tenant's business resulting from any theft, act of God,
public enemy, injunction, riot, strike, insurrection, war, court order,
requisition, order of governmental body or authority, fire, explosion, falling
object, steam, water, rain, snow, breakage, leakage, obstruction or other defects
of pipes, sprinklers, wires, appliances, plumbing, air conditioning or lighting
fixtures, construction, repair or alteration of the Premises or other cause
beyond Landlord's control.
12.
Insurance. On or before the date of this Lease, Tenant shall, at
Tenant's sole cost, procure and continue in force the following insurance
coverage:
(a) commercial general liability insurance with a combined single
limit for bodily injury and property damage or not less that $1,000,000 per
occurrence, including, without limitation, contractual liability coverage for the
performance by Tenant of the indemnity agreements set forth in Paragraph 11: (b)
fire and extended coverage insurance, including vandalism, malicious mischief,
special cause of loss including theft, in an amount equal to the full replacement
cost (without deduction for depreciation) of all furnishings, trade fixtures,
leasehold improvements, equipment, merchandise and other personal property from
time to time situated in or on the Premises; and (c) workmen's compensation
insurance satisfying Tenant's obligations under the workmen's compensation laws
of the State of Utah. Such minimum limits shall in no event limit the liability
of Tenant under this Lease. Such liability insurance shall name Landlord and any
other person specified from time to time by Landlord as an additional insured,
such property insurance shall name Landlord as a loss payee as Landlord's
interests may appear, and both such liability and property insurance shall be
with companies licensed to do business in the State of Utah and reasonably rated
to be able to handle losses for which Tenant is insured. All liability policies
maintained by Tenant shall contain a provision that Landlord and any other
additional insured, although named as an insured, shall nevertheless be entitled
to recover under such policies for any loss sustained by Landlord and Landlord's
agents and employees as a result of the acts or omissions of Tenant. Tenant
shall furnish Landlord certificates of coverage.
No such policy shall be
cancelable or subject to reduction of coverage or other modification except after
thirty (30) days' prior written notice to Landlord by the insurer. All such
policies shall be written as primary policies, not contributing with and not in
excess of the coverage which Landlord may carry, and shall only be subject to
such deductibles as may be approved in writing in advance by Landlord. Tenant
shall, at least ten (10) days prior to the expiration of such policies, furnish
Landlord with renewals of, or binders for, such policies. Landlord and Tenant
waive all rights to recover against each other, against any other tenant or
occupant of the Shopping Center and against the officers, directors,
shareholders, partners, joint venturers, employees, agents, customers, invitees
or business visitors of each other or of any other tenant or occupant of the
Shopping Center, for any loss or damage arising from any cause covered by any
insurance carried by the waiving party. Landlord and Tenant shall cause their
respective insurance carriers to issue appropriate waivers of subrogation rights
endorsements to all policies of insurance carried in connection with the Premises
or the contents of the Premises. Tenant shall cause all other occupants of the
Premises claiming by, through or under Tenant to execute and deliver to Landlord
a waiver of claims similar to the waiver of subrogation rights endorsements. Any
mortgage lender interested in any part of the Shopping Center may, at Landlord's
option, be afforded coverage under any policy required to be secured by Tenant
under this Lease by use of a mortgagee's endorsement to the policy concerned.
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13.
Damage or Destruction. If the Premises are partially damaged or
destroyed by any casualty insured against under any insurance policy maintained
by Landlord, Landlord shall, on receipt of the insurance proceeds, repair the
Premises to substantially the condition in which the Premises were immediately
prior to such destruction. Landlord's obligation under the preceding sentence
shall not exceed the lesser of the cost of the standard improvements installed
by Landlord in the Premises, or the proceeds received by Landlord from any
insurance policy maintained by Landlord. Until such repair is complete, the
Basic Monthly Rent shall be abated proportionately commencing on the date of such
damage or destruction as to that portion of the Premises rendered untenantable,
if any. If (a) the Premises are damaged as a result of a risk not covered by
Insurance; (b) the Premises are damaged in whole or in part during the last
twelve (12) months of the Term, or (c) insurance proceeds adequate to repair the
Shopping Center are not available to Landlord for any reason, or (d) the cost to
repair the Premises is greater than the market value of the Premises, Landlord
may either elect to repair the damage or cancel this Lease by notice of
cancellation within sixty (60) days after such event, and on such notice Tenant
shall vacate and surrender the Premises to Landlord
If Landlord elects to
repair any such damage, any abatement of Basic Monthly Rent shall end on notice
given by Landlord to Tenant that the Premises have been repaired
If the damage
is caused by the negligence of Tenant or Tenant's Occupants, Basic Monthly Rent
shall not abate
Except for abatement of Basic Monthly Rent, if any, Tenant
shall have no claim against Landlord for any loss suffered by reason of any such
damage, destruction, repair or restoration, nor may Tenant terminate this Lease
as the result of any statutory provision in effect on or after the date of this
Lease pertaining to the damage and destruction of the Premises or the Shopping
Center The proceeds of all insurance carried by Tenant on Tenant's furnishings,
trade fixtures, leasehold improvements, equipment, merchandise and other personal
property shall be held in trust by Tenant for the purpose of the repair and
replacement of the same
Landlord shall not be required to repair any damage or
to make any restoration of replacement of any furnishings, trade fixtures,
leasehold improvements, equipment, merchandise and other personal property
installed in the Premises by Tenant or at the direct or indirect expense of
Tenant
Unless this Lease is tb oiinated by Landlord pursuant to this Paragraph,
Tenant shall be required to restore or replace such furnishings, trade fixtures,
leasehold improvements, equipment, merchandise and other personal property on
damage or destruction in at least a condition equal to that existing prior to
such'fvent
Tenant shall not be required to commence any reconstruction of the
Premises or to open the Premises for business unless and until stores comprising
fifty (50%) percent of the leasable square footage of the Shopping Center give
Landlord written commitments that they intend to reopen their stores within one
nundred eighty (180) days of the casualty
If the Landlord cannot produce such
commitments w i t H n ninety (90) days after the date of the casualty, Tenant may
nave the optioi to terminate this Lease within thirty (30) days of the end of
such sixty (60) day period
In add tion, in the event of a casualty in which the Lease is not terminated the
Landloid shall commence restoration of the premises within 120 days of the date
of the casualty and complete the restoration within 240 days of the date of
casualty
14
Condemnation
As used in this Paragraph the term "Condemnation
Proceedings" means any actions or proceedings in which any interest in the
Shopping Center is taken for any public or quasi-public purpose by any lawful
authority through exercise of the power of eminent domain or by purchase or
otherwise in lieu of such exercise
If the whole of the Premises is taken
through Condemnation Proceedings, this Lease shall automatically terminate as of
the date of the taking
The phrase "as of the date of the taking" means the date
of taking actual physical possession by the condemning authority of such earlier
date as the condemning authority gives notice that it is deemed to have taken
possession
If part, but not all, of the Premises is taken, Landlord may
terminate this Lease
Landlord may terminate this Lease if any portion of the
Shopping Center (whether or not including the Premises) is taken which, in
Landlord's judgment, substantially interferes with Landlord's ability to operate
or use the Shopping Center for the purposes for which the Shopping Center was
intended Any sucn termination must be accomplished through written notice given
no later than sixty (60) days after, and shall be effective as of, the date of
such taking
In all other cases, or if neither Landlord nor Tenant exercises its
right to terminate, this Lease shall remain in effect.
If a portion of the
Premises is taken and this Lease is not terminated, the Basic Monthly Rent shall
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be reduced in the proportion that the floor area taken bears to the total floor
area of the Premises immediately prior to the taking. Whether of not this Lease
is terminated as a consequence of Condemnation Proceedings, all damages or
compensation awarded for a partial or total taking, including any award for
severance damage and any sums compensating for diminution in the value of or
deprivation of the leasehold estate under this Lease, shall be the sole and
exclusive property of Landlord, provided that Tenant shall be entitled to any
award for the loss of or damage to Tenant's trade fixtures or loss of business,
provided that a separate award is actually made to Tenant and that the same will
not reduce Landlord's award. Tenant shall have no claim against Landlord for the
occurrence of any Condemnation Proceedings, or for the termination of this Lease
or a reduction in the Premises as a result of any Condemnation Proceedings. If
any taking of the Premises, parking area of Shopping Center will unreasonably and
materially interfere with the successful operation of Tenant's business, Tenant
may terminate this Lease upon sixty (60) days written notice to Landlord.
If
requested by Landlord, Tenant must be prepared to show that the taking has
unreasonably and materially effected Tenant's business.
15.
Landlord's Financing.
This Lease shall be subordinate to any
existing or future first mortgage, first deed of trust, ground lease, dcclaration
of covenants, conditions, easements and restrictions, declaration of planned unit
development or declaration of condominium, and all renewals, modifications,
amendments, consolidations, replacements and extensions of any such instruments.
No documentation other that this Lease shall be required to evidence such
subordination. If the holder of any mortgage or deed of trust elects to have
this Lease superior to the lien of its mortgage or deed of trust and fives
written notice of such election to Tenant, this Lease shall be deemed prior to
such mortgage or deed of trust. Tenant shall execute such documents which may
be required by Landlord to confirm such subordination or priority within thirty
(30) days after request. Any sale, assignment or transfer of Landlord's interest
under this Lease or int he Premises, including any such disposition resulting to
this Lease and Tenant shall attorn to Landlord's successors and assigns and shall
recognize such successors or assigns as Landlord under this Lease, regardless of
any rule of law to the contrary or absence of privity of contract.
16.

Default

16.1 Default by Tenant. The occurrence of any of the following
events shall constitute a default by Tenant under this Lease: (a) Tenant fails
to timely pay any installment of Basic Monthly Rent, Tenant's Share of Operating
Expenses or any other sum due under this Lease within fifteen (15) days after
written notice is given to Tenant that the same is past due; (b) Tenant fails to
timely Observe or perform any other term, covenant or condition to be observed
or performed by Tenant under this Lease within thirty (30) days after written
notice is given to Tenant of such failure; provided, however, that if more than
thirty (30) days is reasonably required to cure such failure, Tenant shall not
be in default if Tenant commences such cure within such thirty (30) day period
and diligently prosecutes such cure to completion; (c) Tenant or any guarantor
of this Lease dies (if an individual), files a petition in bankruptcy or
insolvency or for reorganization or appointment of a receiver or trustee,
petitions for or enters into an arrangement for the benefit of creditors or
suffers this Lease to become subject to a writ of execution and such receiver or
trustee' is not discharged within sixty (60) days: (d) Tenant vacates or abandons
the Premises.
16.2 Remedies. On any default by Tenant under this Lease, Landlord
may at any time, without waiving or limiting any other right or remedy available
to Landlord, (a) perform in Tenant's stead any obligation that Tenant has failed
to perform, and Landlord shall be reimbursed promptly for any cost incurred by
Landlord with interest from the date of such expenditure until paid in full at
the rate of 15% per annum (the "Interest Rate"); (b) terminate Tenant's rights
under this Lease by written notice; (c) reenter and take possession of the
Premises by any lawful means (with or without terminating this Lease); or (d)
pursue any other remedy allowed by law Tenant shall pay to Landlord the cost of
including reasonable renovation, remodeling and alteration of the Premises, the
amount of any commissions paid by Landlord in connection with such reletting, and
all other costs and damages arising our of Tenant's default, including attorneys'
fees and costs. Notwithstanding any termination or reentry, the liability of
Tenant for the rent reserved in this Lease shall not be extinguished for the
balance of the Term, and Tenant agrees to compensate Landlord on demand for any
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deficiency arising from reletting the Premises at a lesser rent that applies
under this Lease. Landlord shall use reasonable efforts to mitigate its damages
in the event, of an uncured default by Tenant.
16.3 Past Due Amounts; Obligations Independent. If Tenant fails to
pay within ten (10) days following the date due any amount required to be paid
by Tenant under this Lease, such unpaid amount shall bear interest at the
Interest Rate from the due date of such amount to the date of payment in full,
with interest. In addition, Landlord may also charge a sum of five percent (5%)
of such unpaid amount as a service fee. This late payment charge is intended to
compensate Landlord for Landlord's additional administrative costs resulting fro/a
Tenant's failure to timely perform Tenant's obligations under this Lease, and has
been agreed on by Landlord and tenant after negotiation as a reasonable estimate
of the additional administrative costs which will be incurred by Landlord as a
result of such failure. The actual cost in each instance is extremely difficult,
if not impossible, to determine. This late payment charge shall constitute
liquidated damages and shall be paid to Landlord together with such unpaid
amount. The payment of this late payment charge shall not constitute a waiver
by Landlord of any default by Tenant under this Lease. All amounts due under
this Lease are and shall be deemed to be rent or additional rent, and shall be
paid without abatement, deduction, offset, prior notice or demand (unless
provided by the terms of this Lease). Landlord shall have the same remedies for
a default in the payment of any amount due under this Lease as Landlord has for
a default in the payment of Basic Monthly Rent and all other amounts due and to
perform all of Landlord's obligations under this Lease are severable from and
independent of any obligation of Landlord under this Lease.
16.4 Default by Landlord. Landlor^shall not be in default under
this Lease unless Landlord or the holder of £a£ mortgage or deed of trust
covering the Shopping Center whose name and address have been furnished to Tenant
in writing fails to perform an obligation required of Landlord under this Lease
within thirty (30) days after written notice by Tenant to Landlord has failed to
perform such obligation. If the nature of Landlord's obligation is such that
more than thirty (30) days are reasonably required for performance or cure,
Landlord shall not be in default if Landlord or such holder commences performance
within such thirty (30) days period and after such commencement diligently
prosecutes the same to completion.—In no event may Tenant tcrm-Hiatc this Lease
or- withhold the payment of rent or other charges provided for in this Lease-as
a result of Landlord's default. If the Landlord fails to perform any of its
obligations under this Lease and the same shall continue for thirty (30) days
with respect to any repairs required to be made by the Landlord or for thirty
(30) days with respect to other matters to be done or performed by the Landlord
after Tenant's written notice of same, except in the case of an emergency, then
Tenant may, but shall not be required to, undertake to do anything required to
be done by the Landlord at Landlord's cost and expense.
17.

Expiration or Termination.

17.1 Surrender of Premises. On the expiration of the Term or sooner
termination of this Lease, Tenant shall, at Tenant's own cost, (a) promptly and
peaceably surrender the Premises to Landlord "broom clean," in good order and
condition; (b) repair any damage to the Shopping Center caused by or in
connection with the removal of any property from the Premise by or at the
direction of Tenant; and (c) deliver all keys to the Premises to Landlord.
Before surrendering the Premises, Tenant shall, at Tenant's sole cost, remove
Tenant's movable personal property and trade fixtures (including signage) and any
other items which are unique and customarily found in a Little Caesar Store.
Landlord may require Tenant to remove any personal property, trade fixtures,
other property, alterations, additions and improvements made to the Premises by
Tenant or by Landlord for Tenant, and to restore the Premises to their condition
on the date of this Lease. All personal property, trade fixtures and other
property of Tenant no. removed from the Premises on the abandonment of the
Premises or on the expiation of the Term or sooner termination of this Lease for
any cause shall conclusively be deemed to have been abandoned and may be
appropriated, sold, stored, destroyed or otherwise disposed of by Landlord
without notice to, and without any obligation to account to, Tenant or any other
person.- Tenant shall pay to Landlord all expenses incurred in connection with
the disposition of such property in excess of any amount received by Landlord
from such disposition. No surrender of Premises shall be effected by Landlord's
acceptance of the keys or of the rent or by any other means without Landlord's
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written acknowledgement of such acceptance as a surrender. Tenant shall not be
released from Tenant's obligations under this Lease in connection with surrender
of the Premises until Landlord has inspected the Premises and delivered to Tenant
a written release.
17.2 Holding Over. Tenant shall indemnify, defend and hold harmless
Landlord from and against all claims, liabilities and expenses, including
attorneys' fees, resulting from delay by Tenant in surrendering the Premises in
accordance with the provisions of this Lease. If Tenant remains in possession
of the Premises or any part of the Premises after the expiration of the Term or
sooner termination of this Lease with the written consent of Landlord, such
occupancy shall be a tenancy from month to month at a rental (and not as a
penalty) in the amount of one hundred twenty-five percent (125%) of the last
monthly rental, plus all other charges payable under this Lease, and on all of
the terms of this Lease applicable to a month to month tenancy.
17.3 Survival. The provisions of this Paragraph 17 shall survive
the expiration of the Term or sooner termination of this Lease.
18.
Estoppel Certificate. Tenant shall, within thirty (30) days after
Landlord's request, execute and deliver to Landlord an estoppel certificate in
favor of Landlord and other persons as Landlord shall request setting forth the
following:
(a) a ratification of this Lease; (b) the Commencement Date and
Expiration Date; (c) that this Lease is in full force and effect and has not been
assigned, modified, supplemented or amended (except by such writing as shall be
stated); (d) that all conditions under this Lease to be performed by Landlord
have been satisfied, or, in the alternative, those claimed by Tenant to be
unsatisfied; (e) that no defenses or offsets exist against the enforcement of
this Lease by Landlord, or, in the alternative, those claimed by Tenant; (f) the
amount of advance rent, if any (or none if such is the case), paid by Tenant; (g)
the date-to which rent has been paid; and (h) such other information as Landlord
may request. Landlord's mortgage lenders and purchasers shall be entitled to
rely on any estoppel certificate within such thirty (30) day period, Landlord may
provide the requested information to the mortgage lenders and purchasers and it
will be accepted as correct by Tenant.
19.

Parking; Signage.

19.1 Parking. Automobiles of Tenant and Tenant's Occupants shall be
parked 'only within parking areas not otherwise reserved by landlord or
specifically designated for use by any other tenant or Occupants associated with
any other tenant. Landlord may from time to time designate parking space for
Tenant and make such other rules and regulations as Landlord reasonably
determines to be necessary or appropriate.
Landlord and Landlord's
representatives may, without any liability to Tenant or Tenant's Occupants, cause
to be removed any automobile of Tenant or Tenant's Occupants that may be parked
wrongfully in a prohibited or reserved parking area, and Tenant agrees to
indemnify, defend and hold harmless Landlord from and against all claims,
liabilities and expenses, including attorney's fees, arising in connection with
such removal.
19.2 Signage. Subject to the prior written approval of Landlord,
Tenant shall purchase and erect one sign on the front of the Premises not later
that the date on which Tenant opens for business or thirty (30) days after the
Commencement Date, whichever is sooner. Tenant shall have the right to maintain
window banners, placards, neon signage and other advertising materials within the
Premises which are used in other Little Caesar stores without obtaining
Landlord's consent.
Tenant shall not place or suffer to be placed on any
exterior door, wall or window of the Premises, on any part of the inside of the
Premises which is visible from outside of the Premises or elsewhere in the
Shopping Center, any sign, decoration, lettering, attachment, advertising matter
or other thing of any kind, without first obtaining Landlord's written approval.
Landlord may, at Tenant's cost, and without notice or liability to Tenant, enter
the Premises and remove any item erected in violation of this Paragraph.
Landlord may establish rules and regulations governing the size, type and design
of all such items and Tenant shall abide by such rules and regulations. All
approved signs or letterings on doors shall be printed, painted and affixed at
the sole cost of Tenant by a person approved-by landlord, and shall comply with
the requirements of the governmental authorities having jurisdiction over the
Shopping Center. At Tenant's sole expense, Tenant shall maintain all permitted
6/NAB/CAESAR.LSE
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signs and shall, on the expiration of the Term or sooner termination of this
Lese, remove all such permitted signs and repair any damage caused by such
removal. Landlord and Tenant acknowledge that Tenant is currently operating in
the Premises and that Tenant's sign is currently accepted as being in conformance
with center's established sign criteria. Should Tenant wish to modify or change
its exterior signage Tenant must obtain Landlord's consent prior to doing so.
However, Tenant's standard national signage will be considered as being in
conformance to the center's sign criteria as it relates to exterior signage.
20.

Substitution.

Deleted

21.
Rules. Tenant and Tenant's Occupants shall faithfully observe and
comply with all of the rules set forth on the attached Exhibit D, and Landlord
may from time to time amend, modify or make additions to or deletions from such
rules so long as said rules do not unreasonably

interfere

with Tenant's

business.

Such amendments, modifications, additions and deletions shall be effective on
notice to Tenant. On any breach of any of such rules, Landlord may exercise any
or all of'the remedies provided in this Lease on a default by Tenant under this
Lease and may, in addition, exercise any remedies available at law or in equity
including the right to enjoin any breach of such rules. Landlord shall not be
responsible to Tenant for the failure by any other tenant or person to observe
such rules.
22.

General Provisions.

22.1 No Partnership. Landlord does not by this Lease, in any way or
for any purpose, become a partner or joint venturer of Tenant in the conduct of
Tenant's business or otherwise.
22.2 Force Majeure. If either Landlord or Tenant is delayed or
hindered in or prevented from the performance of any act required under this lese
by reason of acts of God, strikes, lockouts, other labor troubles, inability to
procure labor or materials, fire, accident, failure of power, restrictive
governmental
laws, ordinances, regulations or requirements of general
applicability, riots, civil commotion, insurrection, war or other reason no the
fault of the party delayed, hindered or prevented and beyond the control of such
party (financial inability excepted), performance of the action in question shall
be excused for the period of delay and the period for the performance of such act
shall be extended for the period equivalent" to the period of such delay. The
provisions of this Paragraph shall not, however, operate to excuse Tenant from
the prompt payment of rent or any other amounts required to be paid under this
Lease.
22.3 Notices. Any notice or demand to be given by Landlord or
Tenant to the other shall be given in writing by personal service, telegram,
express mail, Federal Express, DHL or any other similar form of courier or
delivery service, or mailing in the United States mail, postage prepaid,
certified, return receipt requested and addressed to such party as follows:
If to Landlord:
Wallace Associates Management/Receiver
165 South Main Street
Salt Lake City. UT 84111
If to Tenant:
Little Caesar Enterprises, Inc.
Fox Office Centre
2211 Woodward Avenue
Detroit, MI 48201-3400 •
ATTN: National Ops.
Either Landlord or Tenant may change the address at which such party desires to
receive notice on written notice of such change to the other party. Any such
notice shall be deemed to have been given, and shall be effective, on delivery
to the notice address then applicable for the party to which the notice is
directed; provided, however, that refusal to accept delivery of a notice or the
inability to deliver a notice because of an address change which was not properly
communicated shall not defeat or delay the giving of a notice.
6/NAB/CAESAR.LSE
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22.4 Severability.
If any provision of this Lease or the
application of any provision of this Lease to any person or circumstance shall
to any extent be invalid, the remainder of this Lease or the application of such
provision to persons or circumstances other than those as to which such provision
is held invalid shall not be affected by such invalidity. Each provision of this
Lease shall be valid and enforceable to the fullest extent permitted by law.
22.5 Broker Commissions. Except as agreed in writing by Landlord,
Tenant represents and warrants that no claims exist for brokerage commissions or
finder's fees in connection with this Lease and agrees to indemnify, defend and
hold harmless Landlord from and against all claims, liabilities and expenses,
including attorney's fees, arising from any such brokerage commissions or
finder's fees.
22.6 Use of Pronouns. The use of the neuter singular pronoun to
refer to Landlord or Tenant shall be deemed a proper reference even though
Landlord .or Tenant may be an individual, partnership, association, corporation
or a group of two or more individuals, partnerships, associations or
corporations. The necessary grammatical changes required to make the provisions
of this Lese apply in the plural sense where more than one Landlord or Tenant
exists and to corporations, associations, partnerships, individuals, males or
females, shall in all instances be assumed as though in each case fully
expressed.
22.7 Successors. Except as otherwise provided in this Lease, all
provisions contained in this Lease shall be binding on and shall inure to the
benefit of Landlord and tenant and their respective heirs, devisees, successors,
assigns and legal representative. On any sale or assignment (except for purposes
of security or collateral) by Landlord of the Premises or this Lease, Landlord
shall, on and after such sale or assignment, be relieved entirely of all of
Landlord's obligations under this Lease and such obligations shall, as of the
time of such sale or assignment, automatically pass to Landlord's successor in
interest.22.8 Recourse by Tenant. Anything in this Lease to the contrary
notwithstanding, Tenant shall look solely to the equity of Landlord in the
Premise, subject to prior rights of the holder of any mortgage or deed of trust,
for the collection of any judgment (or other judicial process) requiring the
payment of money by Landlord on any default or breach by Landlord with respect
to any of the terms, covenants and conditions of this Lease to be observed or
performed by Landlord, and no other assets of Landlord or any other person shall
be subject to levy, execution or other procedures for the satisfaction of
Tenant's remedies.
22.9 Quiet Enjoyment. On Tenant paying the rent reserved under this
Lease and observing and performing all of the terms, covenants and conditions on
Tenant's part to be observed and performed under this lease, Tenant shall have
quiet enjoyment of the Premises for the Term without interference from Landlord,
or anyone claiming by, through or under Landlord, subject to all of the
provisions of this Lease.
22.10 Waiver.
No failure by any party to insist on the strict
performance of any covenant, duty or condition of this Lease or to exercise any
right or remedy consequent on a breach of this Lease shall constitute a waiver
of any such breach or of such or any other covenant, duty or condition. Any
party may, by notice delivered in the manner provided in this Lease, but shall
be under no obligation to, waive any of its rights or any conditions to its
obligations under this Lease, or any covenant or duty of any other party.
Nonwaiver shall affect or alter the remainder of this Lease but each other
covenant, duty and condition of this Lese shall continue in full force and effect
with respect to any other then existing or subsequently occurring breach.
22.11 Rights and Remedies. The rights and remedies of Landlord and
Tenant shall not be mutually exclusive and the exercise of one or more of the
provisions of this Lease shall not preclude the exercise of any other provisions.
The parties confirm that damages at law may be an inadequate remedy for a breach
or threatened breach by any party of any of the provisions of this Lease. The
parties' respective rights and obligations under this Lease shall be enforceable
by specific performance, injunction or any other equitable remedy.
6/NAB/CAESAR.LSE
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22.12 Authorization.
Each individual executing this Lease does
represent and warrant to each other so signing (and each other entity for which
another person may be signing) that he has been duly authorized to deliver this
Lease in. the capacity and for the entity set forth where he signs.
22.13 Attorney's Fees. If any action is brought to recover any rent
or other amount under this Lease because of any default under this Lease to
enforce or interpret any of the provisions of this Lease, or for recovery of
possession of the premises, the party prevailing in such action shall be entitled
to recover from the other reasonable attorney's fees (including those incurred
in connection with any appeal), the amount of which shall be fixed by the court
and made-* a part of any judgment rendered. Tenant shall be responsible for all
expenses ir»c\)rre^ ty Land'toTd, tocto^to^, vnthovit Marital ton, attorney f ^ s ,
that Landlord incurs in any case or proceeding involving Tenant under or related
to any bankruptcy or insolvency law.
22.14 Merger.
The surrender of this Lease by Tenant, the
cancellation of this Lease by agreement of Landlord and Tenant or the termination
of this Lease on account of Tenant's default shall not work a merger, and shall,
at Landlord's option, either terminate any subleases or part or all of the
Premises or operate as an assignment to Landlord of any of this subleases.
Landlord's option under this paragraph 22.14 may be exercised by notice to Tenant
and all known subtenants in the Premises.
22.15 Miscellaneous. The captions to the Paragraphs of this Lease
are for convenience of reference only and shall not be deemed relevant in
resolving questions of construction or interpretation under this Lease. Exhibits
referred
to in this Lease and any addendums, riders and schedules attached to
this Lease shall be deemed to be incorporated in this Lease as though a party of
this Leass. Tenant shall not record this Lease or a memorandum or notice of this
Lese without the prior written consent of Landlord. This Lease and the exhibits,
riders and addenda, if any, attached, constitute the entire agreement between the
parties." Any guaranty delivered in connection with this Lease is an integral
part of this Lease and constitutes consideration given to Landlord to enter into
this Lease. No amendment to this Lease shall be binding on Landlord or Tenant
unless reduced to writing and signed. Unless otherwise set forth in this Lese,
all references to Paragraphs are to Paragraphs in this Lease. Each provisions
to be performed by Tenant shall be construed to be both a covenant and a
condition. This Lease shall be governed by and construed and interpreted in
accordance with the laws of the State of Utah. Venue on any action arising our
of this Lease shall be property only in the District Court on the county in which
the Premises are located, in the State of Utah, Landlord and Tenant waive trial
by jury in any action, proceeding or counterclaim brought by either of them
against the other on all matters arising our of this Lease or the use and
occupancy of the Premises. Time is of the essence of each provision of this
Lease. The submission of this Lease to Tenant is not an offer to lease the
Premises or an agreement by Landlord to reserve the Premises for Tenant.
Landlord shall not be bound to Tenant until Tenant has duly executed and
delivered duplicate original copies of this Lese to Landlord, and Landlord has
duly executed and delivered one of those duplicate original copies to Tenant.
LAN0L0R0 AND TENANT have executed this Lease on the respect've dates set
forth below, to be effective as of the date first set forth above.
LANDLORD:
^*\

Its:

Wallace
Associates
Management/Receiver

^^iQCiATi0^9

Date: ?? /! ft?>
Ccesar
Inc.

Its:

3*d££r4Ay/7%£ASi/A££-

D a t e : ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ J:
6/NAR/fAP^AD I cr
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EXHIBIT A
to
SHOPPING CENTER LEASE

DESCRIPTION OF PREMISES
The Premises referred to in the foregoing instrument are located on the
crosshatched area shown on the attached diagram.
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EXHIBIT B
to
SHOPPING CENTER LEASE

PREPARATION OF PREMISES FOR OCCUPANCY
The respective obligations (if any) of Landlord and Tenant to prepare the
Premises referred to in the foregoing instrument for occupancy are set forth on
the attachments. (If neither Landlord nor Tenant have any obligations to prepare
the Premises for occupancy, type "None" below on this page.)
"None"
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EXHIBIT C

SIGN CRITERIA
The following sign criteria has bee established to assist tenants in complying
with their lease. These basic standards have ben made to govern the design,
fabrication, and installation of tenant signs and are intended to afford all
tenant with good visual identification day and night and to protect against
poorly designed and badly proportioned signage. It will also assure the tenants
that the center will maintain its high quality image.
1.

Submission of Design and Approval
Tenant agrees, at Tenant's expense, to furnish Landlord, within reasonable
time from the execution of the lease, a detailed drawing in duplicate of
Tenant's proposed sign using the following signage criteria. After being
submitted, Landlord shall have twenty (20) days from receipt of said
drawings to approve or reject said drawings. Landlord approval shall be
in writing to Tenant within the aforementioned twenty (20) days. Should
Landlord reject said drawings, Tenant shall have twenty (20) additional
days from date of rejection to correct and resubmit the revised drawing to
Landlord for Landlord's approval. Tenant agrees that it will not install
its sign until receipt of written approval from Landlord.

2.

Sign Band
A.'
B.
C.

D.
E.
F.
G.'
H.
3.

Location on Sign Band
A.
B.
C.
D.

4.

Tenant signage shall only be located in a specified zone in front of
Tenant's space except end Tenants and corner Tenants who will be
approved on a case-by-case basis by Landlord.
S'gnage shall be horizontally centered in allowed space and shall
not exceed 8 0 % of store front.
All letters shall line up along the imaginary base reference lines,
4" above the bottom of sign b^nd.
No lettering will be allowed U extend either above or below said
sign band.

Letter Size and Type
A.
B.
C.

5.

Type of Construction:
All lettering shall be internally
illuminated, "pan channel" type construction, individual letter with
plexiglass front.
"Channelume" type letters will not be allowed.
Mounting: All individual letters shall be raceway mounted on a
metal raceway not to exceed 6" high and 6" deep.
No visible
fasteners to be allowed. Raceway shall be primed and painted with
an
automotive
grade
acrylic
enamel
color
to Landlord's
specifications.
Wording of signs shall not include the product sold except as part
of Tenant's trade name. Logos or insignia will be permitted on a
case-by-case basis.
No exposed crossovers, conductors,or conduit between letters will be
allowed.
No animated, flashing, or audible signage will be permitted.
No box or can signs allowed.
Signage colors should be conservative to avoid detracting from the
image of the center.

Maximum letter height: 24 inches
Minimum letter height:
6 inches
All letters and logos will be a standard 5 inches in depth.

Attarhmpnt" Prnvieinnc
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6.

Secondary Signs

To maintain a high quality look for the center, the following requirements
must be met for all display windows and exterior doors.
A.
B.
C.
D.

E.

7.

General Guide!ines
A.
B.
C.

8.

No secondary exterior signs will be allowed on the building.
No sandwich, easel, portable, or temporary box signs are allowed.
Window signs to be allowed only on a temporary promotional basis as
approved by the Merchant's Association. Signs not to exceed 25% of
window. Neon, flashing, or animated signage will not be allowed.
Tenant Window or Display Signage:
1.
Lighted, interior box signs will not be allowed.
2.
No temporary or permanent paper signs shall be permitted to be
applied to the interior exterior faces of store front glass.
3.
All temporary promotional signs and displays in the store
front shall be of professional quality.
4.
Window or door signage shall be printed letters no larger than
6 inches in height.
No signage will be allowed on the rear of the buildings except a 12"
x 12" plastic, engraved sign stating tenant's name or "No
Deliveries" or "Exit" only. Letters shall be white with a black
background.

Tenant Responsibility: All signs, permits, and related or resulting
construction, shall be Tenant's responsibility, and all signs shall
be installed under supervision of Landlord.
No sign makers' identification, tabs, or stickers shall be permitted
on the sign or sign band.
Sign contractor shall repair any damage to work caused by his work.
All signs must conform to local building and electrical codes and
EPA requirements.

Summary
This criteria should be given to the Tenant's sign company to serve as a
guide in preparing their design and cost estimates. In the event of any
conflict in interpretation between Tenant and Landlord as to the
application of this criteria, the decision of the Landlord shall be final
and binding upon the Tenant.
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EXHIBIT D

to
SHOPPING CENTER LEASE

RULES

The rules set forth in this Exhibit are a part of the foregoing Shopping
Center Lease (the "Lease"). Whenever the term "Tenant" is used in these rules,
such term shall be deemed to include Tenant and Tenant's Occupants.
The
following rules may from time to time be modified by Landlord in the manner set
forth in the Lease. The terms capitalized in this Exhibit shall have the same
meaning as set forth in the Lease.
1.
Obstruction, Any sidewalks, entries, exits, passages, corridors,
halls, lobbies, stairways elevators or other common facilities of the Shopping
Center shall not be obstructed by Tenant or used for any purpose other than
ingress or egress to and from the Premises. Tenant shall not place any item in
any of such locations, whether or not such item constitutes an obstruction,
withoiit the prior written consent of Landlord.
Landlord may remove any
obstruction or any such time without notice to Tenant and at the expense of
Tenant. Any sidewalks, entries, exits, passages, corridors, halls, lobbies,
stairways, elevators or other common facilities of the Shopping Center are not
for the general public, and Landlord shall in all cases retain the right to
control and prevent access to them by all persons whose presence, in the
judgement of Landlord, would prejudicial to the safety, character, reputation or
interests of the Shopping Center or Landlord's tenants. Tenant shall not go on
the foof of the Shopping Center.
2.
Deliveries. All deliveries and pickups of merchandise, supplies,
materials, garbage and refuse to or from the Premises shall be made only through
such access as may be designated by Landlord for deliveries and only during the
ordinary business hours of the Shopping Center. Tenant shall be liable for the
a c t s ^ r omissions of any persons making such deliveries or pickups. Tenant shall
not obstruct or permit the obstruction of such access.
3.
Moving. Furniture and equipment shall be moved in or out of the
Shopping Center only through such access as may be designated by Landlord for
deliveries and then only during such hours and in such manner as may be
prescribed by Landlord.
If Tenant's movers damage any part of the Shopping
Center, Tenant shall pay to Landlord on demand the amount required to repair such
damage.
4.
Heavy Articles. No safe or article, the weight of which may, in the
reasonable opinion of Landlord, constitute a hazard of damage to the Shopping
Center, shall be moved into the Premises. Other safes and heavy articles shall
be moved into, from or about the Shopping Center only during such hours and in
such manner as shall be prescribed by Landlord in Landlord's reasonable
discretion, and Landlord may designate the location of such safes and articles.
5.
Shopping Center Security.
Landlord may from time to time adopt
appropriate systems and procedures for the security or safety of the Shopping
Center. Landlord shall in no case be liable for damages for any error with
regard to the admission to or exclusion from the Shopping Center of any person.
In the event of an invasion, mob, riot, public excitement or other commotion,
Landlord reserves the right to prevent access to the Shopping Center during the
continuance of the same by closing the entrances to the Shopping Center or any
other reasonable method, for the safety of the tenants and protection of the
Shopping Center and property in the Shopping Center.

7.
Use of Water Fixtures. Water closets and other water fixtures shall
not be used for any purpose other than that for which the same are intended. No
foreign substances of any kind shall be placed in them, and any damage resulting
to the same from use on the part of Tenant shall be paid for by Tenant. No
per^otis shall waste water by tying back or wedging the faucets or in any other
manner. On leaving the Premises, Tenant shall shut off all water faucets and
major electrical apparatus located within the Premises.
8.
No Animals; Excessive Noise. No animals shall be allowed in the
Shopping Center. Tenant shall not place or permit the placement of any radio or
television antenna, loudspeaker, sound amplifier, phonograph, searchlight,
flashing light or other advertising media or device of any nature on the roof or
outside of the boundaries of the Premises (except for Tenant's approved
identification sign) or at any place where the same may be seen or heard outside
of the Premises.
9.
Bicycles.
Bicycles and other vehicles shall not be permitted
anywhere inside or on the sidewalks outside of the Shopping Center, except in
those areas designated by Landlord for bicycle parking.
10.
Trash. Tenant shall not allow any trash or refuse to be placed on
the outside of the Shopping Center, nor shal 1 any trash or refuse be thrown by
Tenant our of the windows or doors, or down the corridors or ventilating ducts
or shafts, of the Shopping Center. All trash and refuse shall be placed in
receptacles provided by Landlord for the Shopping Center or by Tenant for the
Premises.
11.
Exterior Windows, Walls and Doors.
No window shades, blinds,
curtains, shutters, screens or draperies shall be attached or detached by Tenant
and no awnings shall be placed over the windows without Landlord's prior written
consent. Tenant shall keep the display windows and signs of the Premises well
lighted until 11:00 p.m. each night or such shorter period as may be prescribed
by any applicable policies or regulations adopted by any utility or governmental
agency, and shall maintain adequate night lights after that hour or period.
'12.
Hazardous Operations and Items. Tenant shall not install or operate
any s,team or gas engine or boiler, or carry on any mechanical business in the
Premises without Landlord's prior written consent. Tenant shall not use or keep
in the Premises or the Shopping Center any kerosene, gasoline or other
inflammable or combustible fluid or material, or use any method of heating or air
conditioning other than that supplied by Landlord. Explosives or other articles
deemed extra hazardous shall not be brought into the Shopping Center.
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ADDENDUM
1.
#Agency Disclosure: At the signing of this agreement, Wallace Associates
Business Properties Group's agent
Al Belt
represents Landlord, and Tenant
represents themselves. Tenant and Landlord confirm that prior to signing this
agreement written disclosure of the agency relationship(s) was provided.

2.
'-Hazardous Materials Disclaimer: The real estate salespersons and brokers
in thjs transaction have no expertise with respect to toxic wastes, hazardous
materials or undesirable substances. Unless the Landlord can provide definitive
representation regarding the existence or nonexistence of toxic wastes, hazardous
materials or undesirable substances on the Property then inspections of the
Property by qualified experts alone can determine whether or not there are any
current or potentially toxic wastes, hazardous materials or undesirable
substances in or on the Property. Landlord and Tenant warrant that the real
estate salespersons and brokers in this transaction have not made any
representations, either express or implied, regarding the existence or
nonexistence of toxic wastes, hazardous materials, or undesirable substances in
or on the Property. If deemed necessary, it is the responsibility of Landlord
and Tenant to retain qualified experts to deal with the detection and correction
of such matters. Both the Tenant and the Landlord will hold the real estate
sales persons and brokers harmless.
3.
Tenant's minimum rent payable for the remainder of the existing Lease term
shall be reduced as of January 1, 1993, from $1,350.65 to $1,190.00 per month.
4.
Tenant shall have two (2) options to extend this Lease for a period of five
(5) years for each option. Tenant shall give Landlord written notice of its
intent to exercise or not exercise said options one hundred and twenty (120) days
prior to the expiration of the lease term or first option period. The Minimum
Rent for the first option period shall be at a market rate mutually agreed upon
by Tenant and Landlord. In the first option period, the Minimum Rent shall not
be higher than $11.00 per square foot. Rent in the second option period shall
also be at market rates. Market rates shall be at the then prevailing market
rates for similar space in similar shopping centers within 5 miles of the
Shopping Center. Landlord and Tenant shall mutually agree on the market rate
within 30 days of Tenant's notification to Landlord that Tenant wishes to
exercise an option period.
5.
If the anchor space in the center is still vacant after the first two (2)
years of the Lease Term then the Tenant shall have the right to terminate the
Lease upon 90 days notice to Landlord. If requested by Landlord, Tenant must be
prepared to show that the vacancy of the anchor space has materially affected
Tenant's business. Tenant shall have the right to terminate the Lease only
between the twenty fourth (24th) and thirtieth (30th) months of the Lease Term.
6.

Tenant will accept premises in "as is, where is" condition.

7.
Tenant's CAM charges are currently $1.61 per square foot per year. During
the initial term of the Lease, these charges may vary, however, if they go to
$2.00 square foot, then they may not increase by more than 5% per year.
8.
Notwithstanaing anything contained in the Lease to the contrary, Landlord
shall not permit, during the Lease Term or Option Period, in this Shopping Center
or on any adjacent or contiguous property now owned or hereafter acquired by the
Landlord, its successors and assigns or any entity with which Landlord is
associated, the operation or maintenance, other than by Tenant, of a facility
whose business is more than 10% sales from pizza. Also, Landlord shall not grant
any existing or future tenant any exclusive right to sell any food or beverage
which wou'ld in any way prohibit Tenant from selling any item allowed in the Use
clause in, this Lease.
Landlord shall not lease space to an "adult" type
bookstores, a billiard hall, cocktail bar, lounge or other type of business which
would lower the reputation or character of the Shopping Center.

9.
It is understood that the Tenant is currently occupying the Premises and
conducting business and that Landlord and Tenant currently are operating under
that Lease dated February 23, 1987, and amended January 10, 1990. Upon
commencement of this Lease that Lease dated February 23, 1987, shall become null
and void and of no further force and effect.

TITLE: 1 2 ^ ^ U ^
DATE:
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Hie Caesars*
November 2 5 , 19 9 7
VIA CERTIFIED MAIL
Mr, D.E. Williams
BELL CANYON SHOPPING CENTER
P.O. BOX 56
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
RE:

Little Caesars #4416
10600 South 1300 East ~ Sandy City, UT

Dear Mr. Williams:
pursuant to a lease dated December 11, V){)2 between, Wallace
Associates Management-Receiver and subsequentty assigned to Bell
Canyon Shopping Center L,C. {"Landlord") cind Little Caesar
Enterprises, Inc, ("Tenant"), Addendum, item #4, Tenant^must provide
Landlord with written notice of its exercise of its option*
P.lease consider this formal notice that, w* hereby exercise our option
to extend the lease for five (5) years commencing April 1, 1998 and
expiring on March 31, 2003,
It is also indicated in the Addendum, item M#
(30) days from Tenant providing this notice to
Tenant shall mutually agree on the market rate
rate will be determined. However, in no event
be higher than $11.00 per square foot.

that within thirty
Landlord, Landlord and
for which the^rental
shall the minimum rent

Therefore, please contact me immediately so that we can finalize this
lease renewal in accordance with the Wase ierms. Thank you for your
cooperation.
<
Sincerely,

Michael Atwell
Vice President
Real Estate
cc:

Freels

Jttle Caesar Enterprise*, Inc. • Fox Office Comet • 221! Woodward Avenue « Dtn^u. MM w ^ u 48ZO1-340O • ( 313 ) 983-6000 • Fax ( 313 ) 983-6494
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R O Y B. MOORE, P.C. & ASSOCIATES
A Professional Corporation
505 East 200 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102-2007

Roy a Moore, Esq.

Telephone (801) 359-0800
E-mail RBMooreLaw@aol.com
Fax ( 8 0 1 ) 5 3 1 - 7 2 7 1
December 8, 1997

Michael Atwell V.P. Real Estate
Little Caesar Enterprises Inc.
Fox Office Center
2211 Woodward Ave.
Detroit, Michigan 48201-3400
Re: Renewal of Lease at Bell Canyon Shopping Center - space 1341, Sandy, Utah
Dear Mr. Atwell:

Bell Canyon Shopping Center, L.C., the successor in interest as "Landlord" in the above
referenced lease, lias asked this firm to respond to some of the remarks in your letter of November 25,
1997 with respect to the above referenced matter. First of all, it is our impression that Bell Canyon is
pleased that you are interested in remaining in die shopping center for an additional period of time. They
are concerned however that your letter indicates diere is a perception that the option provisions of the
lease limits the Basic Monthly Rent to be no higher than SI 1.00 per square foot
The term 'Basic Monthly Rent" is a defined term in die subject lease. 'Minimuni rent", on die
other hand, is not a defined term in die subject lease, and therefore that phrase takes on the plain meaning
uf dial combination o f words, i.e. dial die minimum rent dial die Landlord will accept on die exercise of
the subject option is S I 1.00 per square fool and dial negotiations between Landlord and Tenant start ai

diat floor for the subject 5 year period. A survey of comparable rents for like space shows that die fair
market rental value of that space in feet exceeds $19.00 per square foot.
Please advise in what manner you desire to proceed widi negotiations on die option period lease
rate.

Very truly yours,
ROY B. MOORE P.C. & ASSOCIATES

Roy B. Moore
cc D.E. Williams
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PARRWJDDOUPS BROWN
GEE & LOVELESS **#^a*^
Attorneys at Law

CLAYTON J. PARR.
C1ARKWADDOUPS
RICHARD G. BROWN
DAVID L GEI
SCOTT W. LOVELESS
PATRICIA W. CHRISTENSEN
ROBERT B. LOCHHEAD
GARY A. DODGE
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March 16,1998

VIA TELECOPIER AND CERTIFIED
MAIL, RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
Roy B. Moore, Esq.
Roy B. Moore, P.C. & Associates
505 East 200 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102-2007
Re: Shopping Center Lease fthe "Lease"), dated December 11.1992, entered
into between Wallace Associates Management-Receiver, the predecessor in interest
to Bell Canyon Shopping Center, L.C. fthe "Landlord"), and Little Caesar
Enterprises. Inc. (the "Tenant")
Dear Mr. Moore:
We represent the Tenant in connection with the Lease. This letter is written in response to
your letter dated December 8, 1997.
As you know, the options to extend the term of the Lease are contained in paragraph 4 of
the Addendum to the Lease, which provides (in part): Tn the first option period, the Minimum Rent
shall not be higher than $11.00 per square foot." (emphasis supplied) This provision clearly
establishes a cap on the "Minimum Rent." We are unable to find any support in the Lease for your
argument that this provision somehow establishes a floor for negotiations between the Landlord and
the Tenant.
Admittedly, the term "Minimum Rent" does not appear to actually be defined as such in the
Addendum or in the Lease. However, it always has been the Tenant's clear understanding that
"Minimum Rent" does, in fact, refer to the "Basic Monthly Rent." (We note that you have not
pointed us to any other component of rent in the Lease to which such term could apply.) The
Tenant's understanding is confirmed by the provision set forth in the immediately preceding
paragraph of the Addendum which provides: "Tenant's minimum rent payable for the remainder of
the existing Lease term shall be reduced as of January 1, 1993, from $1,350.65 to $1,190.00 per
month." It is undeniable that in this paragraph the term "minimum rent" refers to the Basic Monthly
Rent because the Basic Monthly Rent being paid by the Tenant on execution of the Lease in the

185 South State Street • Suite 1300 • Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1536
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PARRW\DDOUPS BROWN GEE ^LOVELESS

Roy B. Moore, Esq.
March 16, 1998
Page -2amount of $1,350.65 per month was, in fact, reduced as of January 1,1993 to $1,190.00. (This is also
the current Basic Monthly Rent being paid under the Lease.) We do not believe that it can
successfully be argued by the Landlord that although the term "minimum rent" in paragraph 3 refers
to the Basic Monthly Rent, the term "Minimum Rent" in paragraph 4, the immediately following
paragraph, refers to something different.
This brings us back to paragraph 4 of the Addendum, which provides that the Basic Monthly
Rent shall be at a market rate mutually agreed on between the Landlord and the Tenant, not to
exceed $11.00 per square foot. We assume from your letter that the Landlord is proposing that the
maximum amount of $11.00 per square foot (or $19,635 per year/$ 1,636.25 per month) be used.
Although that is a 37.5% increase over the current rent (or 7.5% per year) which seems quite
aggressive to the Tenant, in order to resolve the matter the Tenant is willing to accept such amount.
Therefore, enclosed are two (2) original copies of an amendment to the Lease, both of which
have been executed by the Tenant. Please have the Landlord execute one of the enclosures and
return the same to me on or before March 23,1998. If we have not received one of the enclosed
amendments, executed by the Landlord, by close of business on March 23, 1998, we have been
instructed by the Tenant to immediately file a declaratory action to resolve this matter. Because of
the extended period of communication between the Landlord and the Tenant regarding this matter
which already has occurred and the proximity of the expiration date of the initial term, such filing
will necessarily take place without any additional prior communication with you or the Landlord.
Please feel free to contact me or Ron Russell of our office with any questions.

Sincerely,

Victor A. Taylor

cc:

Martin I. Caruso, Esq. (via telecopier; w/enc.)
Ronald G. Russell, Esq. (w/enc.)
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FIRST AMENDMENT TO SHOPPING CENTER LEASE
[Bell Canvon Shopping Center, L.C./Little Caesar Enterprises, Inc.]
THIS AMENDMENT (this "Amendment") is entered into as of the 2nd day of March, 1998,
between BELL CANYON SHOPPING CENTER, L.C., a Utah limited liability company
("Landlord"), whose address is 1365 East 10600 South, Sandy, Utah 84093, and LITTLE CAESAR
ENTERPRISES, INC., a Michigan corporation ('Tenant"), whose address is 2211 Woodward
Avenue, Detroit, Michigan 48201-3400.
FOR THE SUM OF TEN DOLLARS ($10.00) and other good and valuable consideration,
the receipt and sufficiency of which are acknowledged, Landlord and Tenant agree as follows:
1.
Definition-Lease. As used in this Amendment, "Lease" means the Shopping Center
Lease, dated December 11,1992, entered into between Landlord, as landlord, and Tenant, as tenant.
2.
Purpose. Tenant has exercised the first option to extend the Term (as defined in the
Lease). This Amendment is intended to memorialize such extension. (Tenant's second option to
extend the Term has not yet been exercised, but may be exercised in the future in accordance with
its terms.)
3.
Basic Monthly Rent. The definition of "Basic Monthly Rent" set forth in Paragraph
I of the Lease is deleted in its entirety and is replaced with the following new definition:
"Basic Monthly Rent" means $1,636.25 per month.
4.
Expiration Date. The definition of "Expiration Date" set forth in Paragraph 1 of the
Lease is deleted in its entirety and is replaced with the following new definition:
"Expiration Date" means March 31, 2003.
5.
General Provisions. Except as set forth in this Amendment, the Lease is ratified and
affirmed in its entirety. This Amendment shall inure to the benefit of, and be binding on, Landlord
and Tenant and their respective successors and assigns. This Amendment shall be governed by, and
construed and interpreted in accordance with, the laws (excluding the choice of laws rules) of the
Slate of Utah. This Amendment may be executed in any number of duplicate originals or
counterparts, each of which when so executed shall constitute in the aggregate but one and the same
document. Each individual executing this Amendment represents and warrants that such individual
has been duly authorized to execute and deliver this Amendment in the capacity and for the entity
set forth where such individual signs.

c/caesars/amnd.vat
February 27, 1998
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LANDLORD AND TENANT have executed this Amendment on the respective dates set
forth below, to be effective as of the date first set forth above.
LANDLORD:
BELL CANYON SHOPPING CENTER, L.C.

By_
D. E. Williams
Managing Member
Date
TENANT:
LITTLE CAESAR ENTERPRISES, INC

Marian Bayori
Its

Date

c/caesars/amnd.vat
February 27, 1998

-2-

Xixpcn

Secretary/Treasurer
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C o i > • .,
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Ronald G. Russell, Esq. (4134)
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
Attorneys for Plaintiff
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Post Office Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019
Telephone: (801)532-7840

-tt^L

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LITTLE CAESAR ENTERPRISES, INC., a
Michigan corporation,
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF
MARK WHITTLE

)

BELL CANYON SHOPPING CENTER,
L.C., a Utah limited liability company,

)
)

Defendant.

)

STATE OF GEORGIA
COUNTY OF FULTON

Civil No. 980903087CN
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

)
: ss.
)

Mark Whittle, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
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1.

I am over the age of twenty-one years and I have personal knowledge of the

matters stated herein. If called as a witness, I would testify to the matters stated in this
affidavit.
2.

At all relevant times, I was employed by Little Caesar Enterprises, Inc. as the

Director of Company Development. In that position, I was responsible for negotiating
leases for Little Caesar locations throughout the country. Consequently, I am familiar with
lease forms used in shopping center leases and the terms commonly used in those leases.
3.

Little Caesar Enterprises, Inc. was a tenant at the Bell Canyon Shopping Center

in Salt Lake City, Utah and its lease in the shopping center was scheduled to expire. I
acted on behalf of Little Caesar in negotiating the terms of the extension for that lease.
4.

Attached hereto marked Exhibit " 1 " is a copy of the extension lease that I

negotiated on behalf of Little Caesar with Wallace Associates Management (the "Little
Caesar Lease"). The lease form is typical of other shopping center leases.
5.

The lease form used for the Little Caesar Lease is set up to permit both a base

monthly rent as well as a percentage rent. Little Caesar had only been paying base rent
under its prior lease at the shopping center and it was understood and agreed during the
lease negotiations that percentage rent would not apply to Little Caesar for any lease
extension.

2
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6.

As indicated by the Little Caesar Lease, the base rent for years 1 through 5 of

the new lease was $1,190 per month. The provisions regarding the calculation and
payment of percentage rent were intentionally deleted.
7.

Paragraph 3 of said Addendum provided that the base or minimum rent that

was payable for the remainder of the then existing lease term would be reduced from
$1,350.65 to $1,190 per month as of January 1, 1993.
8.

The terms "minimum rent," "basic monthly rent," and "base rent" are

commonly used terms in commercial leasing and are generally understood to mean the
monthly base rent paid by a tenant without regard to a sales volume. "Percentage rent" is
an amount added to the base rent and varies based on a percentage of the tenant's sales
volume.
9.

It is my understanding that the term "minimum rent" used in both paragraphs 3

and 4 of the Little Caesar Lease Addendum refer to the "Basic Monthly Rent" defined in
paragraph 1 of the lease itself and was not intended to refer to any other type or
component of rent.
10.

As reflected by paragraph 4 of the Little Caesar Lease Addendum, we

negotiated with Wallace Associates two options to extend the lease for a period of 5 years
for each option.

3

0000040

11.

It was my understanding of the agreement as reflected by the language used in

paragraph 4 of the Little Caesar Lease Addendum that in the first option period the base
rent or minimum monthly rent would not be higher than $11 per square foot. It was also
my understanding that percentage rent would not apply during the option terms because
the provisions dealing with percentage rent had been intentionally deleted from the lease
form.
DATED this _£

day of-AprH, 1999.

Mark Whittle

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

£

day of ApnSf 1999.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing In
b&JttfCutX,
My Commission Expires:

0Q-U-O&

ytffcs
EXMRES

GEORGIA
SEPX 2M, 2002
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25-5-2

FRAUD

25-5-2. Wills and implied t r u s t s excepted.
Section 25-5-1 shall not be construed to affect the power of a testator m the
disposition of his real estate by last will and testament, nor to prevent any
trust from arising or being extinguished by implication or operation of law
ment, effective May 1, 1995, substituted "Section 25-5-1' for "The next preceding section" at
the beginning of the section

History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 190/, $ 2462;
C.L. 1917, § 5812, R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 335-2; L. 1995, ch. 20, § 41.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1995 amend-

NOTES TO DECISIONS
not in writing Chadwick \ Arnold, 34 Utah 48,
95 P 527 (1908)
A deed given to secure a debt, though absolute in form, was in equit\ a mortgage, so t h a t
a trust was created b\ operation of law and,
under the express language of this section, was
not prevented by § 25-5-1 Tavlor v Turner, 27
Utah 2d 39, 492 P2d 1343 (1972)

As u.\ sis
Constructive trust
Trusts
— Evidence
Wills
Constructive trust.
Equity imposes a constructive trust to pre\ e n t one from unjustly profiting through fraud
or the violation of a duty imposed under a
fiducian or confidential relationship Hawkins
\ Perry 123 Utah 16, 253 P2d 372 (1953)
After defendant altered a certificate of sale of
land by inserting his own name as purchaser, so
that the land v. as not included in the decedent's
estate, there was a constructive trust for the
benefit of the decedent's heirs, and the estate
could be reopened Peny v McConkie 1 Utah
2d 189, 264 P 2d 852(1953)
Constructive trust to prevent unjust enrichment is not within the statute of frauds
Carnesecca \ Carnesecca, 572 P2d 708 (Utah
1977)

—Evidence.
One seeking to h a \ e rights declared and
enforced, founded upon or growing out of trust
or a confidential relation is required to show,
with at least reasonable certainty, the terms of
agreement and the character and extent of the
trust or confidential relation
Coray v
Holbrook, 40 Utah 325, 121 P 572 (1912)
Parol evidence is admissible to show a trust
relationship by operation of law Barrett v
Vickers, 100 Utah 534, 116 P2d 772 (1941)
In an action to impress a trust upon real
property, evidence supported a finding t h a t
grantor's daughter took the property by warranty deed subject to "oral trust" whereby
daughter was to maintain the property as a
family home to be used by grantor and her
children and grandchildren for as long as any of
said persons needed a home, with complete
discretion in the daughter as to the time and as
to wrhich of said persons should use property
Haws v Jensen, 116 Utah 212, 209 P 2 d 229
(1949)
Parol evidence maj be introduced to prove a
constructive trust or resulting trust since they
arise by operation of law and are expressly
excluded from the statute of frauds by this
section In re Estate of Hock, 655 P2d 1111
(Utah 1982)

Trusts.
Trusts arising by implication or operation of
law are expressh excluded from the effects of
the statute, and a deed of conveyance, though
absolute m form, if given to secure a debt, is m
equity treated as a mortgage — a trust by
operation of lav> Wasatch Mining Co \
Jennings, 5 Utah 243, 15 P 65 (1887)
Where defendant verbally agreed with the
owner of real estate which was subject to a
mortgage to bid the property in at foreclosure
sale, and to convey title to plaintiff for a sum
certain after he obtained the sheriffs deed, and
plaintiff relied on such agreement and paid the
specified amount to defendant who asserted
ownership to the property and refused to convey it was held that a trust ex maleficio arose,
and was enforceable though the contract was

Wills.
When a will is sought to be maintained also
as a contract, it must satisfy this and succeeding sections of the statute of frauds Ward v
Ward, 96 Utah 263, 85 P2d 635 (1938)

25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in lands.
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the
sale, of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract, or
8

some note or memorai
whom the lease or s*
authorized in writing
History: R.S. 1898 <5L C
C.L. 1917, § 5813; R.S. 19
5-3.

ANAL\SI«

Agent's authority
Contents of writing
Contract for future lease
Description of land
Executed agreements
Execution of contract
Improvements on land
Interest in real estate
Leases
—Elements
— Option to renew
—Oral extension of lease
Lease with option to lease
Note or memorandum
Option to purchase realty
Oral adjustment of rental rg
Oral renewal of written offei
Part performance of oral cor
—Evidence
Privity of contract
Promissory estoppel
Quantum meruit or unjust e
Sale denned
Settling of accounts
Subscription
Surrender, release or discha
'termination or rescission of
Cited
Agent's authority.
In an action for specific
contract for the sale of rea
absence of evidence showing
was authorized m writing to
or equities taking the case o\
frauds, the trial court proper
for dismissal of the action Le
Utah 401, 195 P 201 (1921)
Where real estate agents
implied authority under list
execute contract of sale of re
of vendors, latter were not b<
°1 an earnest money agreer
Gerstner, 26 Utah 2d 180, 46
Introduction of parol evide
snow that agent who made c
name was acting for corpora
tiie proof did not contradic
merely explained the transa
tate of Siegel, 534 P2d 85 (L

blATUTE OF FRAUDS

r of a testator in the
nor to prevent any
r operation of law.
, 1995, substituted "Seciext preceding section" at
ection.

some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by
whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto
authorized in writing.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2463;
CX. 1917, § 5813; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 335-*3.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
This section requires that any agent executing an agreement conveying an interest m land
on behalf of his principal must be authorized m
writing, since written authorization is required
to clothe the agent initially with authonty to
contract, principal's ratification of an unauthorized act of the agent must be in writing
Bradshaw v McBnde, 649 P2d 74 (Utah 1982)
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Agent's authority
Contents of writing
Contract for future lease
Descnption of land
Executed agreements
Execution of contract
Improvements on land
Interest in real estate
Leases
—Elements
— Option to renew
— Oral extension of lease
Lease with option to lease
Note or memorandum
Option to purchase realty
Oral adjustment of rental rate
Oral renewal of written offer
Part performance of oral contract.
— Evidence
Pnvity of contract
Promissory estoppel
Quantum meruit or unjust ennchment
Sale denned
Settling of accounts
Subscription
Surrender, release or discharge
Termination or rescission of contract
Cited

C o n t e n t s of writing.
A letter which lacks an acknowledgement or
recognition that a contract has been entered
into by the parties, and which is relied upon as
? memorandum written after an oral acceptance of an oral offer of a lease, and not as a
written and signed offer of a lease, is not an
adequate memorandum Birdzell v Utah Oil
Ref Co , 121 Utah 412, 242 P2d 578 (1952)
In an oral contract to execute a lease for a
period longer than one year, the amount of the
rent is one of the essential terms that must
appear in a memorandum Birdzell v Utah Oil
Ref Co , 121 Utah 412, 242 P2d 578 (1952)
C o n t r a c t for f u t u r e l e a s e .
An agreement to enter into a future agreement to lease real estate for a penod longer
t h a n a vear is within the statute of frauds, and
must be in writing to be enforceable SCM Land
Co v Watkins & Faber, 732 P2d 105 (Utah
1986)

Agent's authority.
In an action for specific performance of a
contract for the sale of real propertv in the
ab&ence of evidence showing defendant's agent
was authorized in writing to sell real propertv
or equities taking the case out of the statute of
frauds, the t n a l court properly granted motion
for dismissal of the action Lee v Pohhrones, 57
Utah 401, 195 P 201 (1921)
Where real estate agents had no express or
implied authonty under listing agreement to
execute contract of sale of real estate on behalf
of vendors, latter were not bound by the terms
of an earnest monev agreement Frandsen \
Gerstner, 26 Utah 2d 180, 487 P2d 697 (1971)
Introduction of parol evidence was proper to
bhow that agent who made contract in his own
name was acting for corporate principal, since
the proof did not contradict the writing but
merely explained the transaction Zeese v Estate of Siegel, 534 P 2 d 85 (Utah 1975)

D e s c r i p t i o n of land.
A contract which provided that the purchaser
of land was to make the selection of the land
from a larger tract which was described was
sufficient so that there could be a valid contract Calder v Third Judicial Dist Court, 2
Utah 2d 309, 273 P2d 168, 46 A L R 2d 887
(1954)
Where the parties left the descnption of
Parcel 1 open and "to be approved by all the
parties in writing," the identify and location of
the land to be convened was subject to their
subsequent agreement, and no contract was
formed The buyers were entitled to the return
of their payment, since the document was not a
contract that could be enforced under this section Vasels v LoGuidice, 740 P2d 1375 (Utah
Ct App 1987)
Executed agreements.
This section has no application to agree-
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Plaintiff/Appellee,
PRIORITY 2

v.
KEVIN WRIGHT KTLLIAN,

Case # 20020455-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a Final Judgement and Commitment in the Eighth Judicial District
Court, Duchesne, County, for jury conviction of one count of Operation of a Motor Vehicle
Under the Influence of Alcohol, a Third Degree Felony.
Mr. Killian was sentenced to probation on May 13, 2002. Mr. Killian's probation was
later revoked and he was sentenced to one year in jail with review after nine months for possible
placement in an in-patient treatment program. Both the original sentence and the revocation were
issued by the Honorable Judge A. Lynn Payne, Eighth District Court.
This appeal isfiledpursuant to Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This
Court has jurisdiction to review the conviction pursuant to §78-2a-3.
No post trial motions werefiledeither by trial or appellate counsel. Mr. Killian is
currently incarcerated in the Duchesne County Jail and is awaiting court review of his jail
sentence.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
There is one issue raised for appellate review: Mr. Killian asserts that his trial counsel was
ineffective for not pursuing a theory of defense in which the jury could have found him guilty of
public intoxication rather than DUI. Mr. Killian alleges that although his trial counselfileda
suppression motion on the issue and raised the issue in the preliminary hearing, she did not present
the theory to the jury nor did she request a theory of defense instruction that would have allowed
the jury tofindhim guilty of public intoxication rather than DUI.
The standard of review for ineffective assistance of counsel claims, specifically in a DUI
case was again stated in State v. Wallace,

P.3d

(Utah App. 2002), in which this Court

found that it is a question of law-citing State v. Maestas. 984 P.2d 376 (Utah 1999).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutions, statutory provisions, or rules referenced in this brief and
pertinent to the issues now before the court on appeal are contained herein or attached to this
brief
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Kevin Wright Killian was charged with one count of Driving Under the Influence of
Alcohol (DUI) in violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 on September 1, 2002 (Record of Trial
Court (hereafter referred to as "R", page 1). Herbert Gillespiefileda one count Information on
September 5, 2001 alleging that Mr. Killian had four prior DUI convictions within the last ten
years and therefore this case was enhanced to a Third Degree Felony (R. 2).
Mr. Killian appeared in court on September 4, 2001 and pled not guilty to the charge (R.
7). Trial Attorney Karen Allen was appointed to represent Mr. Killian and on October 15, 2001
2

waived the Preliminary Hearing (R. 21). On December 13, 2001 Karen Allen filed a
Suppression/Pretrial Motion asserting that the case should be dismissed on the basis that the
police knowingly allowed Mr. Killian-a suspected intoxicated person-to get in his motor vehicle
in order to get him with a felony DUI rather than to arrest him for public intoxication when they
first encountered him (R. 27).
The County Attorneyfiledan amended Information on December 18, 2001 alleging
essentially the same conduct and factual basis as the original Information (R. 32). On January 22,
2002 Mr. Killian and counsel argued the suppression motion before the trial court and the trial
court denied the motion (R. 39).
Mr. Killian and counsel then requested and were granted a preliminary hearing on the
amended Information on March 18, 2002 (R. 45) and the case was bound over for trial.
Trial was held on March 26, 2002 and Mr. Killian was convicted in the one day jury trial
of the DUI charge (R. 100-102). On May 16, 2002 Mr. Killian was sentenced to zero to five
years in the Utah State Prison and afivethousand dollar fine. The sentence was stayed and Mr.
Killian was placed on probation with the condition that during the three years probation he was to
be on Adult Probation and Parole supervision, pay a one thousand dollarfineor complete
community service and serve one year in the Duchesne County Jail. The Court granted a review
of the sentence after nine months to see if there was an in-patient alcohol treatment program
available for Mr. Killian to enter into in lie of the remaining jail time (R. 108-109).
The Notice of Appeal was timelyfiledon May 30, 2002 (R. 119). Appellate counsel has
sought and was granted extensions up to and including December 18, 2002 in which tofilethe
opening brief and such is now timely filed.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Officer Ammon Manning of the Roosevelt City Police Department has been employed as a
city police officer and for six years prior was employed as a Duchesne County Sheriffs Deputy
(Transcript of Trial, page 71). On September 1, 2001 Manning was eating lunch at Pinn Willies-a
convenience store and restaurant-with a deputy Travis Tucker and Highway Patrol officer
Stradinger (T. 72). Mr. Killian came into the store area and purchased beer. Manning could
smell the odor of alcohol in the area where Mr. Killian had been and he was concerned (T. 73).
Manning not only smelled the odor of alcohol coming from Mr. Killian but he seemed under the
influence of alcohol because his eyes were glassy (T. 80) and "everything that accompanied him"
(T. 81) indicated he was intoxicated.
Manning watched Mr. Killian go into the bathroom, exit the bathroom, pick up a six pack
of beer, pay for it and exit the store-all the while believing he was under the influence of alcohol
(T. 83).
Manning did not stop Mr. Killian to investigate whether or not he was intoxicated-in fact
he did not make contact with him inside or outside the store in an attempt to determine if Mr.
Killian was under the influence of alcohol (T. 73).
Manning went back to the table and told trooper Stradinger to watch and see if Mr. Killian
got into a vehicle and if he did, to stop him (T. 73). At no time did Manning or Stradinger
investigate if the store had sold beer to an intoxicated person, if Mr. Killian was impaired to the
point that it was a crime to purchase beer or if the public would be in danger if Mr. Killian drove a
vehicle away from the store (T. 71-74).
Stradinger went outside and got into his patrol car to follow Mr. Killian and pull him over.
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However, Manning's car was blocking Stradingers and there was a delay while Manning moved
his police car (T. 73). Stradinger followed Mr. Killian out onto the highway and off on a dirt road
(T. 73). Manning followed Stradinger (T. 73).
Manning arrived at the residence of Ray and Joann Pollard's where Stradinger had Mr.
Killian out of his car and was performing field sobriety tests (T. 74). Manning asked Stradinger if
his police video camera was on to catch thefieldsobriety tests and then went into Stradinger's car
to turn on the video when Manning discovered it was not turned on up to that point (T. 74-75).
Manning admitted on cross-examination that he knew Mr. Killian drank and that he was
under..." (T. 88) although the sentence was cut off it is clear that Manning knew some of Mr.
Killian's history (T. 86-89).
Trooper Stradinger testified that he was in Pinn Willies restaurant on September 1, 2001
when he saw Mr. Killian come into the store area and purchase a 12 pack of beer (T. 93).
Stradinger was told by Manning to watch to see if Mr. Killian got into a car because Manning was
sure he smelled alcohol on Mr. Killian (T. 94). Stradinger left the restaurant and got into his
patrol car. He was blocked in by Manning's patrol car but quickly was able to pursue Mr. Killian
out onto the highway and then onto a dirt road (T. 94-95).
Stradinger activated his lights on the dirt road and Mr. Killian pulled over and exited the
car at which point Stradinger smelled the odor of alcohol on him (T. 97-98). Stradinger made
Mr. Killian perform field sobriety tests which Mr. Killian failed (T. 98-108) and then Stradinger
arrested him and took him to jail where he performed a chemical breathalyser test on Mr. Killian
(T. 108).
Stradinger stated that it took Mr. Killian 2 tenths of a mile to pull over (T. 97-98) but he
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also testified that Mr. Killian was on a dirt road and his truck was kicking up a dirt cloud behind it
(T. 128). Stradinger did not testify to a driving pattern that indicated an impaired driver, he did
not testify that Mr. Killian's failure to immediately pull over on the private drive was an indicator
of intoxication-in fact no driving pattern or probable cause for the stop was given other than
Manning's statement that Mr. Killian smelled of alcohol and was intoxicated in the store (T. 131140).
Mr. Killian failed thefieldsobriety tests and was arrested for the DUI. The factual
statements about thefieldsobriety tests are not included here as Mr. Killian is not arguing that he
was not intoxicaited or that the tests were inappropriate in any way.
The jury found Mr. Killian guilty of the charge of driving under the influence of alcohol
(T. 203) and that Mr. Killian had prior offenses and therefore the conviction was a felony (T.
204). A pre-sentence investigation report was completed and Mr. Killian was subsequently
sentenced to one year in jail with early release after nine months to an in-patient treatment
program. Mr. Killian does not contest aspects of the sentence or revocation hearing.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Mr. Killian asserts that with four prior DUI convictions he was known to law enforcement
as a "drinker." Furthermore, he asserts that the police were anxious to see him charged with a
felony. It is for that reason that the police officers at the store-who could smell alcohol on Mr.
Killian and were under the belief that he was intoxicated-did not stop him at the store to inquire
further. The police did not approach him, ask him to answer their questions or investigate any
further while Mr. Killian was at the store. The police waited until Mr. Killian left the store and
got into a motor vehicle and drove off before they even tried to pursue him.
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If the officers did not have enough probable cause to stop Mr. Killian in the store to
investigate if he was intoxicated, how did they have enough probable cause to stop him on the
road?
The theory of defense that Mr. Killian wanted presented was that the police knew him as
"drinker" and they purposely did not stop in the store so that they could stop him later on in his
car and get him with a felony DUI rather than a public intoxication misdemeanor.
Although trial counsel raised the Motion to Suppress in the trial court prior to trial and it
was denied, Mr. Killian asserts that she should have raised it before the jury and requested a
theory of defense instruction that would have allowed the jury to find him guilty of public
intoxication. By failing to assert this defense at trial and failing to ask fo the special jury
instruction Mr. Killian now alleges that his trial attorney was ineffective in her representation of
him.1
ARGUMENT
Mr. Killian asserts on appeal that his trial attorney was ineffective in not pursuing his
theory of defense at trial and requesting a special jury instruction. Trial counsel raised the issue at
the suppression hearing and she pursued it a preliminary hearing. However, Mr. Killian asserts
that had she pursued the theory before the jury and requested a public intoxication jury instruction
that the outcome of his trial would have been different.
In State v. Wallace,

P.3d

(Utah App. 2002), at issue was the states's request for a

lesser included offense instruction. Mr. Wallace argued that the state should not have been

Respite requests from appellate counsel, to date Mr. Killian has not responded to
inquiries as to his desire to pursue any 23B remand or other issues on appeal.
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afforded the right to submit the instruction. However, in that case, as in this case, the defendant
did not preserve an objection on the record. When the defendant does not preserve the claim it
can only be addressed on appeal if it one of plain error or if the trial counsel was ineffective in
representation.
In regard to plain error, the issue here is different. In this case the issue is one of the lack
of defense theory and the requisite instruction to support the theory-not the erroneous inclusion
of an instruction. Here Mr. Killian cannot support a claim of plain error in that he cannot show
that the court should have proposed a theory of defense and the requisite instructions. Such a
claim would be without merit.
To establish plain error, Mr. Killian would have to show a) an error exists; b) the error
should have been obvious to the trial court; and c) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there
is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant. As set forth above, Mr.
Killian cannot argue the trial judge should have developed a theory of defense instruction for him.
However, Mr. Killian does assert that the doctrine of ineffective assistance of counsel
should apply in his case to allow this Court to review his claim-as it did in Wallace.
Mr. Killian asserts that his trial counsel knew there was a claim to be raised regarding the
officer's conduct. She had raised it in pre-trial motions. However, she failed to pursue that
theory of defense in an in-depth manner at trial. It is touched on in closing argument and no
specific jury instructions were given to support the theory. Mr. Killian asserts it was a very viable
defense. There was no way in a small town that the group of police at the store did not know of
Mr. Killian's prior four DUI convictions. Moreover, if he had a strong odor of alcohol and the
police had probable cause to stop him-the stop should have occurred at the store. The police
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never should have allowed Mr. Killian to get in the car and drive. If they did not have probable
cause to stop him at the store-they did not have probable cause to stop him on the road. Mr.
Killian believed then and does now that the police were setting him up.
Although trial counsel touched briefly on this theory-it was not pursued adequately at
trial. Furthermore, she did not request a public intoxication jury instruction as a theory of defense
or lesser included offense instruction.
In Wallace, this Court provided "The Utah Supreme Court has explained that "when the
prosecution seeks instruction on a proposed lesser included offense, both the legal elements and
the actual evidence or inferences needed to demonstrate those elements must necessarily be
included within the original offense charged." citations omitted. Here, Mr. Killian asserts that the
instruction should have been given-if not as a lesser included offense-then at least as a theory of
defense instruction.
" In pertinent part, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 states, "A person may not operate . . . a
vehicle within this state if the person: . . . (ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the
combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely
operating a vehicle." Id. § 41-6-44(2)(a)(ii)"
Utah Code Ann. §76-9-701. Intoxication - provides that a person is guilty of public
intoxication when:
(1) A person is guilty of intoxication if he is under the influence of alcohol, a controlled
substance, or any substance having the property of releasing toxic vapors, to a degree that the
person may endanger himself or another, in a public place or in a private place where he
unreasonably disturbs other persons.
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Mr. Killian asserts that public intoxication should be a lesser included offense or at the
minimum a theory of defense jury instruction and that his trial counsel should have pursued his
defense theory with vigor and then submitted the requisite instruction to support his defense
argument. Both require intoxication to a point that dangerousness to self or others becomes an
issue. Mr. Killian asserts that the police should have stopped him in the store and charged his
with public intoxication rather than to set him up for the DUI. He believes that if that theory was
proposed in a more effective way to the jury and if they had the option to convict him of public
intoxication rather than DUI that they would have.
Mr. Killian asserts that by failing to assert the defense theory and failing to submit the
instruction that his trial counsel's actions fell below the standard necessary for effective
representation. Again, in Wallace, the defendant raised the issue and this Court held:
"To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, [Wallace] must establish (1)
that his trial counsel's performance was ' deficient,' and (2) that he was ' prejudiced' by the
ineffective assistance." citations omitted.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Killian must show that defense
counsel's representation "Tell below an objective standard of reasonableness,'" and that, but for
the deficient representation, there is a "reasonable probability" that the result would have been
different. . . . "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome." Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068
(1984).
Mr. Killian asserts that to raise his theory of defense in pretrial motions and then to all but
abandon them ait trial in front of the jury was ineffective assistance of counsel. Further, he asserts
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that failure to submit a jury instruction on public intoxication fell below the objective standard of
reasonableness. Finally, he argues that but for the failures on the behalf of trial counsel the result
in his jury trial would have been different. Mr. Killian is sure that he would have been found
guilty of public intoxication and the jury would have seen through the set up by the police officers
had defense counsel been more vigilant.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Killian respectfully requests that this Court to vacate his conviction for a Third
Degree Felony on the basis that at most the jury should have convicted him public intoxication but
due to the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel the jury was never presented with the
appropriate defense or applicable jury instruction.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s / ^ d a y o f Z > / ^ * ^ , 2002.
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DUCHESNE COUNTY, DUCHESNE DEPARTMENT
—oooOooo—
STATE OF UTAH,

JUDGMENT AND
ORDER

Plaintiff,
Criminal No. 011800098

vs.

Judge John R. Anderson
KEVIN WRIGHT KILLIAN,
Defendant.
—oooOooo—

DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS (WITH
PRIORS) - A THIRD DEGREE FELONY
The above-entitled case came before the Court for Sentencing on Monday, May 13, 2002,
the Honorable Judge John R. Anderson, presiding. The defendant was present and was
represented by his attorney, Karen Allen. The State of Utah was represented by Herbert Wm.
Gillespie, Duchesne County Attorney. The Court had received the Pre-Sentence Investigation
Report prepared by Adult Probation and Parole. Statements were made by counsel for the
parties.
NOW THEREFORE, based upon the file and record herein, it is hereby ORDERED,
ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
That the defendant has been convicted by a Jury of the offenses of Driving Under the

Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs (With Priors), a Third Degree Felony, in violation of
Section 41-6-44 UCA (1953) as amended.
That for the offense of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs (With
Priors), a Third Degree Felony, it is hereby ordered that the defendant is sentenced to serve an
indeterminate term of not to exceed five (5) years in the Utah State Prison, and to pay a fine in
the sum of $1,000.
The foregoing prison sentence is suspended and the defendant is placed on supervised
probation through for a period of three (3) years upon the following terms and conditions:
1. The defendant shall serve one (1) year in the Duchesne County Jail, with a review of
this sentence in 180 days to determine if the defendant has arranged to enter into an in-house
alcohol/drug treatment program. The defendant shall report to the Duchesne County Jail no later
than 2:00 p.m. on Monday, May 20, 2002, to begin this period of incarceration.
2. The defendant shall pay the fine in this matter on terms set forth by Adult Probation
and Parole or shall perform 200 hours of community service at the direction of Adult Probation
and Parole.
3. The defendant shall not possess or consume alcohol or be where alcohol is being
possessed or consumed or frequent any establishment where alcohol is the chief item of order.
4. The defendant shall successfully complete a substance abuse treatment program to
include AA/NA meetings, as recommended by his probation officer.
5. The defendant shall install an Interlock Device, at his own expense, on any vehicle
that he operates.
6. The defendant shall not associate with or remain at any residence where alcohol or
drugs are being used.

7. The defendant shall be subject to warrantless searches by any law enforcement officer
to ensure compliance with the terms of his probation agreement.
8. The defendant shall carry with him at all times the offender identification card
provided to him by Adult Probation and Parole and present the identification card to any law
enforcement officer with whom he comes in contact.
9. The defendant shall take Antibuse as directed by Adult Probation and Parole if it is
cleared by a doctor.
DATED this V^_ day of May, 2002.

'JOHN R. ANDERSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
Approved as to form:

Karen Allen
Attorney for Defendant
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